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A TRIBUTE TO JACQUES HERSH 
EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF  
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
On the Occasion of his Retirement as Director of DIR 
 
 
The Palestinian-American Scholar, Edward Said, once defined the intellectual as 
"someone whose place it is publicly to raise embarrassing questions, to confront 
orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to produce them), to be someone who cannot 
be easily co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose raison d’etre is to 
represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under 
the rug.  He is particularly harsh on those who become servants of power, 
handmaidens of authority, propagating the dominant ideas of the day”.   
 
This is exactly what Jacques Hersh has been: An intellectual with a responsibility 
to address the large issues rather than remaining buried in a narrow specialisation, 
speaking a coded language comprehensible only by other specialists.  He has been 
motivated by the desire to answer analytical questions of substantive interest 
rather than the desire or attempt to validate general theoretical perspectives.  
Modesty and resistance against ivory tower preaching have been important virtues 
that he has welcomed and encouraged, well aware of the historical fact that what 
some people regard as common sense today may change to its opposite tomorrow.   
 
Jacques was born in Paris in 1935, and received accreditation from the City 
College of New York, the University of Vienna, and the University of 
Copenhagen.  He moved to Denmark in 1964 with his wife and colleague, Ellen 
Brun, where they worked as free lance writers on development issues and 
international relations, publishing among other things their pioneering work on 
development in North East Asia.  In 1983, Jacques became a Professor in 
Development Theory and International Relations at Aalborg University.  Together 
with Ellen and other colleagues, he continued to write in the press, edit 
magazines, and contribute numerous publications on a variety of subjects 
including the system of capitalist development, Soviet-Third World relations, and 
the US’s role in the rise of East Asia.   
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Jacques was a main force in the establishment of the Research Centre on 
Development and International Relations (DIR) in 1995, and served as its Director 
until his retirement in October 2003.  Among Jacques’ merits is his contribution to 
the cultivation and establishment of a unique dialectical and critical research 
tradition at DIR.  This is manifested in its interdisciplinary approach aimed at 
understanding the interactions between geopolitics, geoeconomics and the socio-
political forces at the global, regional and local levels, and their impact on our 
conceptualisations of the dynamics which global development imposes on local 
societies and the latter’s responses to it.  Through DIR, Jacques endeavoured to 
keep alive the radical spirit that contributed to the university’s establishment.  
Above all, he touched deeply young people in the classrooms by imparting his 
knowledge and experience.   
 
Jacques and Ellen have spoken out in public all their lives without surrender or 
compromise to injustice.  They have lived an examined life as thinker-activists, as 
rebels for justice, as warriors for a non-degrading and ethical life for all people. 
They have related to newcomers not as strangers but as friends, welcoming them 
with open arms and working together with them.  Their efforts have spanned a 
vast spectrum from the academic world to the real world.  Combined with their 
profound thoughtfulness and disarming humility, Jacques and Ellen are truly 
admirable people. 
 
With retirement, Jacques is ending his chapter in the formal academy and starting 
afresh a new chapter with his earned “right to laziness” (to paraphrase the title of a 
book by Karl Marx’s son-in-law, Paul Lafargue).  But a thinker-activist never 
really retires. Jacques everyday presence will be missed, but we look forward to a 
continued connection with him and new type of collaboration in a more virtual, 
spiritual and political sense.   
 
While many people influence one’s life, few are remembered for the special way 
they touch one’s soul and humanity as Jacques and Ellen have.  We wish them 
success and all the best with their new beginning. 
 
From your friends at DIR 
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OLD SPEAK/NEWSPEAK OF (NEO)LIBERALISM ON 
DEVELOPMENT   
 
Jacques Hersh*1   
 
 
Abstract 
In the present context of world affairs, there are good reasons to be sceptical of 
the way events and conflicts are explained and presented by politicians, their spin-
doctors and the media. It would not be surprising if future generations look upon 
our era as “the age of newspeak” or doublespeak: half-truths and lies being used 
to justify policies and actions which are in opposition to established norms of 
morality and decency grounded in the dominant democratic ideology. This article, 
based on the author’s Emeritus lecture, presents the impasse in development 
studies and argues for the inclusion of an international perspective as an 
alternative out of the stalemate. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the book, 1984, by  George Orwell, one of the characters says, “Don’t you see 
that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end, we 
shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible because there will be no words in 
which to express it.” – A wake-up call that has not lost its relevancy! 
In the present context of world affairs, there are good reasons to be sceptical of 
the way events and conflicts are explained and presented by politicians, their spin-
doctors and the media. It would not be surprising if future generations look upon 
our era as “the age of newspeak” or doublespeak: half-truths and lies being used 
to justify policies and actions which are in opposition to established norms of 
morality and decency grounded in the dominant democratic ideology. 
The reason “newspeak” is becoming the main feature of our time’s political 
culture is  the institutionalisation of the  phenomenon, even at the academia level! 
The responsibility of institutions of higher learning is clear, as most politicians, 
                                                 
* Jacques Hersh is Professor Emeritus at the Research Centre on Development and International 
Relations, Aalborg University. 
1 This article is an edited version of the Emeritus lecture given at Aalborg University on October 31, 
2003. 
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spin-doctors and media people are  products of the education system.  This should 
be food for thought for educators and researchers! 
As a student of development and international relations – two areas which 
contrary to  the conventional compartmentalization of disciplines should not be 
studied separately - I propose to present a critical interpretation of our 
contemporary world with its residual tensions, conflicts and prospects. 
In doing so the holistic approach appears to be the appropriate choice. 
Consequently this essay will focus on the following aspects: 
• why history is an important  tool of analysis; 
• the determinance of geopolitics; 
• the theory and practice of liberalism in a development perspective; 
• the contra theory and practice of economic nationalism in a development 
perspective; and 
• the need for new thinking on development and international relations. 
 
THE PRESENT AS HISTORY 
For students of international affairs the task is to make sense of  the apparent 
complexity of the contemporary world. The methodological challenge is to 
understand the past and the present in order to project expectations of the future. 
The political historian E.H. Carr stressed, in his book The New Society (London 
1951), the need “to analyse the past in the light of the present and future which is 
growing out of it, and to cast the beam of the past over the issues which dominate 
present and future”. 
The incorporation of history is necessary in order to comprehend the evolution of 
capitalism to its present mature stage so as to put the  problems facing the national 
units of the international system into perspective and offer reflections on  possible 
developments. The difficulty is how do we do that. Like other disciplines in the 
body of social sciences, history is not neutral! Normative positions are important 
to the extent that they determine, perhaps even more than facts themselves, how 
we understand empirical material. The concepts and theories we choose will 
depend on the questions we ask and affect the results we get. This explains the 
variation of interpretations of the same phenomenon.  
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Part of the problem for social sciences is that once a paradigm has achieved 
hegemony and become adopted by the political elite, it is difficult for alternative 
thinking to be put on the agenda as the premises have been accepted by opinion-
makers and their intellectual acolytes. 
In the  contemporary epoch there have been paradigmic discussions within the 
established politico-scientific community concerning the interpretation of the 
much advertised (and abused) globalisation process in conjunction with the 
demise of state socialism. The importance of such debates is that –although they 
do not touch upon the essence of the workings of the system—they can give 
legitimacy to policy-making. A good example is found in the evolution of the ties 
of mainstream political scientists to US economic and political strategies. 
 
In the first half of the 1990s, two main explanations were offered within the 
American intellectual realm. The political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, provoked 
the Western scientific community following the implosion of the Soviet Union 
with his thesis of “The End of History”. This interpretation of the world took its 
point of departure in the assumption that with the victory of liberal democracy, 
capitalism no longer faced a societal challenge and as a result the whole world 
would now adopt its guidelines. In other words the prophecy “there is no 
alternative” of the former British prime-minister, Margaret Thatcher, had become 
a reality. Thus the “end of history” served the discourse of global neoliberalism by 
intellectually delegitimising the possibility of opposition.  
 
GEOPOLITICS TO THE RESCUE 
However, an opposite  interpretation of the post-Cold War era was suggested  by 
another American political scientist who refuted the notion of the end of history. 
According to Samuel Huntington, even though the Western model of societal 
organization was no longer confronted by the  ideological and political challenge 
of socialism, the world would nevertheless be characterized by what he called 
“The clash of civilizations” i.e., a conflict between the “West and the Rest”. 
Overlooked by most commentators who focused on the cultural theme of the 
thesis, Huntington   identified inequality as a determinant source of tension. The 
problem as he saw it is related to the fact  that the West has a monopoly on world 
resources and international decision-making while  nations in the non-European 
sphere would strive to get their share. The suggested response to this challenge 
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 6  
required a strengthening of Western (including Japan) coherence and 
determination. 
Huntington focused in particular on  the defiance of the Sino civilization and the 
Islamic civilization and the threat the two posed in the form of a potential alliance 
or marriage of convenience between the emerging economic giant China (with  
future oil needs) and the Arab countries (rich in petroleum and in need of Chinese 
economic resources).  
With its emphasis on power politics, “The clash of civilization” thesis which can 
be classified as an up-dating of political Realism following the end of the Cold 
War was published about ten years before the terrorist attack on the United States 
in September 11, 2001 - an historical date which is taken as a determinant point of 
reference in the conventional explanation of the present American engagement in 
the world. However, in the context of US foreign strategy before 9/11, post 9/11 
and future tendencies, the argument  can be made that Washington’s geopolitical 
concern for some time had been/is and will be to gain or maintain control over oil 
resources. The aim is not only to satisfy domestic energy demand but is related to 
the geopolitical strategy of containing the emergence of future challengers to 
American world hegemony.  
Policy papers, prepared more than a decade ago by members of the circle around 
President Bush (the so-called “Neoconservatives”), recommended that the US 
should pursue a strategy of preventing the rise of challengers, including (besides 
China) the EU and Japan. Experts of international relations  have suggested that 
under the pretence of the struggle against  terrorism, the war in Afghanistan aimed 
at establishing a US position in petrol-rich Central Asia while the war in Iraq 
aimed at gaining and maintaining American control over the Middle East. In 
doing so, oil is becoming  an instrument of US foreign policy vis-à-vis  allies as 
well as foes. 
Seen in the context of events in this new millennium, globalisation is neither the 
end of history nor the beginning of a civilisational confrontation between the 
“West and the Rest”. For the non-initiated it may appear paradoxical that  many of 
the main contradictions in the world today are in fact the result of previous 
policies  put into effect by the decision-making centres of the world during the 
second half of the twentieth century. If we look at Huntington’s projected 
conflicts with China and the Arab-Islamic world we get an illustration of the 
scope of US responsibility.  
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Concerning the potential Chinese threat, the irony is that the West (principally the 
United States) did its utmost to encourage the political class of China to abandon 
the socialist path of self-centred development and adopt a proto-capitalist system 
and integrate into the international division of labour. The prospect of a huge 
market was attractive to world capitalism until it was realized that China would 
also acquire a production capacity which would have to be absorbed in the world 
economy. The historical analogy to the opening of Japan and its absorption  as an 
industrial power in the capitalist world system is relevant. This process was 
characterized by contradictions and conflicts contributing to the Second World 
War. In this connection and contrary to conventional thinking, the tendency 
towards overproduction should be recognized as  the main economic problem in 
the functioning of the international capitalist system.   
The other paradox related to the thesis of the clash of civilizations is located in the 
Middle East where religion was used against secularism. During  the postcolonial 
period, US strategy had been  to encourage and support Islamic revivalism in the 
struggle against Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism. The antagonism towards 
these movements was of course related to  control of oil.  
Not unlike the present conflict in Iraq, the United States and Britain in 1953 
pioneered  regime-change in Iran by implementing the removal of the nationalist 
and democratically elected government of Mossadegh whose cardinal sin had 
been the  nationalization of  the country’s oil industry! In Afghanistan, it was the 
United States who  mobilized and encouraged the creation of an “Islamic 
International Legion” to fight the Soviet invasion. The “blow back” effect or 
unintended consequence of US strategy is that Islamic fundamentalism is now 
joining its natural enemy, namely secular nationalism, in becoming anti-
American.  
This geopolitical digression is meant to underline the contradictory nature of the 
world order in the age of so-called globalisation and to confirm  the assumption  
that  something can be learned from history concerning the dynamics of present-
day capitalism as an international  system which will shape the future. 
 
(NEO)LIBERALISM: A DOUBLE-TONGUED DISCOURSE ON 
DEVELOPMENT  
There are good reasons to be wary of  the dominant discourse which plays a 
crucial role in determining economic and policy-making on the world scale.  
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Neoliberalism, as the ideological and theoretical framework of globalisation, 
proposes an ideal-type  projection of economic harmony between all nations 
preconditioned on the adoption  by all states of “good policies”. These are 
restrictive macroeconomic policy, free trade, free capital movement, privatisation, 
deregulation and democracy. A kind of one-size-fits-all economic policy. 
Pushed by the so-called “Washington Consensus” this discourse has been 
adopted by the main international economic organizations (IMF, World Bank and 
World Trade Organization). The presupposition  is that with the removal of all 
hindrances to exchanges between countries and adaptation to the demands of the 
world market, all nations will gain and have the possibility of improving their 
situation. This recipe is said to apply for  the strong economies as well as for the 
weak economies.  
Seen in the context of world poverty, this vision should be taken seriously. From 
the prism of economic development, the globalisation problematique raises the 
issue of whether present-day capitalism is conducive to the homogenisation of 
economic levels of the different countries and whether less developed societies 
stand a better chance of acceding to the highest levels of economic development 
by internalising and accepting the guidelines and rules which have emerged in the 
leading centres of capitalism. Were these concerns to be answered affirmatively, 
this would indeed represent the ultimate reversal of what Polanyi called The Great 
Transformation!  
Although this issue is crucial, its essence is not without precedent. A comparative 
analysis between the past and present can thus be illuminating. Economic history 
makes us aware that such recommendations (especially liberalization of 
international trade) resemble the so-called “cosmopolitan” economics promoted 
by Great Britain when British hegemony of the world economy was at its peak. 
The present discourse of neoliberalism under the conditions of globalisation or 
Americanisation – which some critical voices call this process - bears a striking  
resemblance to the liberalism preached under  British dominance. Seen in this 
light, neoliberalism can be conceived as the ideological framework to add 
legitimacy to US domination and as such signifies a remarkable “back to the 
future” continuity. 
The weakness of the proposition, that if all lift the boat together it will bring 
prosperity to all, is apparent. After decades of implementation of global 
neoliberalism, only a handful of developing countries have been able to achieve a 
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substantial degree of growth.  Furthermore this was done not by adopting “good” 
free market strategies but by following a form of state-directed capitalism – China 
being a case in point. It is telling that during the 1997-financial crisis in East Asia, 
the countries of the region who implemented policies of capital control (China, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong) were able to avoid the consequences of 
the blow-up. 
In this context, we see in Asia what appears to be an interesting anomaly and  
which may give rise to a newer hybrid-type of society. Here we have the 
Vietnamese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party who previously 
had struggled against Western imperialism, actively engaged in capitalist growth 
strategies and societal construction under a communist political system building 
some kind of protocapitalism using the notion of market socialism as legitimation. 
Another  interesting example of doublespeak! 
In order to grasp the scope of the discrepancies of the conventional Western 
ideological propositions in light of the realities of the Third World it is useful to 
dwell upon the use/misuse of history in relation to the general question of 
development. 
During the systemic confrontation between socialism and capitalism following the 
Second World War, a body of development theories emerged in the United States. 
Known as modernization theory, its “godfather” the American sociologist Walt 
Rostow published the book The Stages of Economic Growth with the subtitle: An 
Anti-Communist Manifesto! The  objective of modernization theory was to project 
the evolution of European capitalist development as the ideal-type model to be 
emulated as a counterweight to socialist development which could be observed in 
the Soviet space and in East Asia, as well as some countries in the Third World. 
The example  and experience of Western capitalism was implicitly considered to 
be applicable to the situation of underdevelopment in the post-colonial world. 
In doing so, little attention was paid to the fundamental divergences which 
distinguished the specificity of capitalist development in the Western European 
cultural sphere from that of most of the rest of the world. Although interrelated, 
the two experiences were quite dissimilar. First and foremost, while the 
international dimension played an important developmental  role in determining 
the evolution of European capitalism, it is less certain that ties to the industrialized 
centres  constituted a positive impulse  for late developers. The windows of 
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opportunity offered by the modern world economy to the periphery were not/are  
not the same. 
The father of liberalism, Adam Smith, as well as the father of socialism, Karl 
Marx, comprehended the importance of contact to extra-European areas for the 
specific development of capitalism. Thus Adam Smith stated the following in his 
magnum opus The Wealth of Nations (1776): 
One of the principal effects of those discoveries (America and the 
passage to the East Indies through the cape of Good Hope) has been to 
raise the mercantile system (commerce) to a degree of splendour and 
glory which it could never have otherwise attained.  
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the Communist Manifesto (1872) explicitly 
specified  the significance of the extra-European world for the transition to  
capitalism in Europe: 
The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened fresh 
ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, 
the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the 
means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to 
navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to 
the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid 
development. 
In the relationship that evolved between the European centres and the periphery, 
the position of what became the colonial areas was always subordinated to the 
interests of the developed countries. This legacy lives on! The present   guidelines 
given in the context of modernization theory and neoliberalism relative to 
relations to the world market were/are truncated in favour of the advanced 
capitalist countries. The already strong economies are able to reap most of the 
benefits that  an  open world market offers. As the American economic historian 
Charles Kindleberger put it: “Free trade is the protection for the established 
exporters” (cited by Schlosstein in Trade War). 
Historical evidence shows that capitalist economic  development is not the result 
of a spontaneous occurrence. The process has been characterized by a determined 
struggle  demanding  concentration of human and material resources on the 
internal evolution of the economy and protection from the forces of the world 
market. In addition, as the capitalist industrial countries did not develop at the 
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same time and pace, late development or catching-up required political guidance 
of market forces in the past. This notwithstanding, the message given to so-called 
late developers by the conventional development discourse ignores the true 
experience of capitalism.  
It is an irony of history that the liberalism of British capitalism, based on the 
teachings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, was not promoted until the 
industrial revolution had made England the factory of the world. Only after the 
need to export had become strong and British industry was able to out compete 
other countries, did England impose the notion of free trade on the rest of the 
world.  
It is often conveniently forgotten that prior to reaching this level, Britain had 
protected her industrial growth by limiting imports of Indian and Chinese silks 
and textiles and then prohibiting, to the best of her ability, the import of such 
wares by continental Europe. This was a contributing factor – but of course not 
the only one -   to the demise of the industrial revolution in these Asian countries. 
The notion of “comparative advantage” was imposed on weaker nations by 
political and military means. The Treaty of Methuen (1703) between Britain and 
Portugal is a case in point. The logic behind the theory was that agrarian 
economies should concentrate on their advantage in producing foodstuffs and raw 
materials, while England would export manufactured products. To the extent that 
the theory ignores the fact that “comparative advantage” is not a permanently 
given economic factor and by not including the possibility of changing a country’s 
position in the international division of labour through political strategies, the 
concept  remains a static notion. 
It is interesting to note that  today, the gist of policy recommendations by the IMF 
and World Bank to Third World countries has also been to concentrate on the 
exports of products in which they have a comparative advantage and keep their 
markets open. The problem arises however when this advice is given to groups of 
countries, like those of Sub-Sahara Africa or Central and South America, who 
overproduce similar traditional commodities and in this manner push world prices 
down because the world market cannot absorb more bananas or coffee. The 
demand for such produce being  inelastic means that even if prices go down there 
is a limit to the consumption of bananas!  
In a passage in The Wealth of [‘some’] Nations, Adam Smith considered the 
United States “like Poland” destined to rely on agriculture; he warned Americans 
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against the attempt to promote the country’s beginning industrialization by 
protecting the so-called infant industries. The policy he recommended was to open 
the economy to the import of European (British) manufactures as the opposite  
course of promoting  American industrial production would:  
retard instead of accelerating the further increase in the value of their 
annual produce, and would obstruct instead of promoting the progress 
of their country towards real wealth and greatness (Smith 1776:347-
348).  
 
ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT 
Had American decision-makers of that time followed the advice of the eminent 
economist whose theoretical teachings they today profess adherence to, the United 
States would indeed have been a very different nation.  The same can be said 
about Germany and Japan. Had the Japanese elite following the Meiji Restoration 
(1868) not taken the political decision of industrializing in order to become a 
strong developed nation, the Japanese would be known only as an exporter of  
rice-wine!   
Contrary to the liberal interpretation,  history shows that the development of 
industrial capitalism did not depend on purely economic impulses but was a 
process in which politics played a determining   role. This applied not only to late-
comers. Thus while the theoretical framework of market liberalism stressed free 
trade, evidence suggests that  Britain used state-directed trade and industrial 
policies to the same extent as later developers did. The non-correspondence 
between practice and theory/ideology of liberalism  was not lost on economists of 
less developed Western nations.  
It was no accident that while the doctrine of liberalism (free trade) originated  in 
England, the counter-doctrine emerged in countries who wanted to reach the same 
levels of industrialization. While liberalism projected the world market as a 
benign entity conducive to benefit all participants, the doctrine  was challenged by  
the German economist, Friedrich List, who became known as the theoretician  of 
economic nationalism. The essence of the contra-position found expression in  the 
logic of development in a world where the developed are not really interested in 
the industrialization of late-comers. Accordingly this theory recognizes that 
participation in world trade is a zero-sum game where some gain and some lose! 
In The National System of Political Economy (1885), a book which later found 
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greater resonance in modern East Asia than in Western conventional development 
thinking, he put it in the following way: 
It is a very common device that when anyone has attained the summit of 
greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in 
order to deprive others of the means of climbing after him. In this  lies 
the secret of the cosmopolitical doctrine of Adam Smith, and … all his 
successors in the British Government administrations.   
Friedrich List had been very much influenced by a stay in the United States, 
where he observed first hand the implementation of a strategy of industrialization. 
It was in fact in the United States, in the latter part of the eighteenth century and 
in the nineteenth century, that  protection of “infant industries” from the influence 
of the world market (in this case British exports) was formulated and put into 
practice. At that time numerous American intellectuals and politicians understood 
that free-trade was not suitable for their country. This conclusion had been 
reached  even though liberal economists of renown had entertained the notion that 
protection of American industries would be counterproductive and that the United 
States should specialize in agricultural production. 
According to List,  it was fortunate that Americans had rejected the analysis of 
Adam Smith, opting instead in favour of “common sense” and the instinct of 
economic nationalism in the interest of the nation by protecting their beginning 
industrialization. In the context of economic development it is important to 
emphasize that the doctrine of economic nationalism is not the same as 
anticapitalism. On  the contrary! What it implies is a strategic retreat from the 
world market in order to rejoin it in a stronger position, later on. Criticizing the 
British sermons of free trade for the United States, the American president 
Ulysses S. Grant  declared that “within 200 years, when America has gotten out of 
protection all that it can offer, it too will adopt free trade” (cited in Ha-Joon 
Chang 2003:26). This is exactly what the United States did by remaining  the 
most heavily protected economy in the world until the Second World War.  
The rationale behind industrialization for “late-comers” has been related to the 
imperative of making the nation economically prosperous and strong in order to 
impose itself politically in the world. This is dictated by the modus operandi of 
international capitalism whereby weak nations are dominated by the strong ones. 
In this non-congenial international environment, the emergence of new industrial 
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powers has historically had a geopolitical impact on the system of nation-states - a 
system  which originated simultaneously with the birth of capitalism.  
The catching-up of Germany, the United States and Japan, challenged the position 
of Britain as the leader of the capitalist system. It was this confrontation between 
the different capitalist countries which contributed  to the world wars of the 
twentieth century. One  attempt to explain this state of affairs is located within the 
Marxist tool-box which operates with the notion of “uneven development” of 
capitalism.  As a result of   the tendency to develop at different rates, the more 
advanced countries will at a certain stage be challenged by more dynamic new  
comers. In a world economy  characterized by the above-mentioned tendency 
towards overproduction, the emergence of new industrial powers creates 
imbalances   and results, as recognized by Max Weber  in conflictual competition 
which will affect the societies involved: 
Only complete political confusion and naïve optimism can prevent the 
recognition that the unavoidable efforts at trade expansion by all 
civilized bourgeois-controlled nations, after a period of seemingly 
peaceful competition, are clearly approaching the point where power 
alone will decide each nation’s share, and hence its people’s sphere of 
activity, and especially its workers’ earning potential (Hobsbawm 
1987:Ch. 3). 
The interaction between development, trade and power politics on the 
international level is furthermore related to the fact that the late-comers often were 
led by ultra-nationalist or fascist regimes who also promoted militarism. The 
exception to the rule was the emergence of the United States as leader of the 
capitalist world without having abandoned parliamentary democracy  during its 
ascendancy in the first half of the twentieth century. Although having joined the 
imperialist powers in the “opening” of China and having forcefully gained control 
of the Philippines and Cuba, the United States was able to use geography as a 
comparative advantage in relation to potential rivals. Thus while the 
contradictions between the main industrial nations were being played out in 
Europe, the United States - who also followed a course of  economic nationalism - 
managed to remain aloof.  By coming into the two world wars  rather late, the 
United States could reap  benefits from  the weakening of potential economic and 
political rivals, without having itself suffered damages on its soil. 
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The hegemony of the United States following the Second World War was 
institutionalised through the creation of  international organizations where 
American interests  were given priority. The division of the world between the 
“socialist camp” –under the domination of the Soviet Union - and the “free world” 
helped to cement the hegemony of both superpowers in their respective spheres.   
 In contrast to the era of neoliberalism, which achieved  hegemony since  the 
1980s, during the post-World War II reconstruction period, capitalist countries 
followed state managed economic policies in achieving unprecedented growth and 
popular support. Even Richard Nixon once declared himself to be a Keynesian. 
The so-called Keynesian macroeconomics allowed governments to exert control 
over the economic relations to the world market.  
Another variant of state management of the economy took hold in East Asia. Prior 
to World War II,  Japan  had followed the strategy of economic nationalism which 
continued   after its defeat and during  the American occupation. The Japanese 
socio-economic and political system  functioned on the basis of what has been 
called the “capitalist developmental state”. This type of capitalism was closer to 
the theory and ideology of economic nationalism than economic liberalism. Even 
though the United States after the Second World War, supervised Japanese 
politics, it didn’t discourage (with the exception of militarism) Japan from 
returning to its older state form and economic policy. The American position was 
determined by geopolitical considerations. At the time the US political 
establishment felt the need to promote Japanese capitalism and make the country 
an actor in Asia. This was  dictated by the concern of countering  the influence of 
socialism in the region, especially after the victory of communism in China.  
The potency of state dirigisme of the market  was also a determinant factor  in the 
evolution of the so-called East Asian NICs (newly industrializing countries). 
Motivated by the ideology and strategy of economic nationalism while under the 
dual hegemony of the United States and Japan, South Korea and Taiwan also  
became known as developmental states. The economic strategy was based first  on 
import substitution industrialization before implementing a course of export-
oriented industrialization. Due to a special set of circumstances, the East Asian 
countries were able to control to a certain extent import of finished products and 
foreign capital while drawing advantage of being able to export especially to the 
United States as Japan followed a more restrictive import policy. 
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As mentioned, there was a political  imperative behind the US strategy of turning 
the East Asian countries into display-windows of successful capitalist 
development. In this relation it should furthermore be stressed that it was 
primarily the  Korean War and the war in Indochina later on, which fostered the 
economic take-off of first Japan and then the  NIC’s in East Asia. 
In contrast, it was much more difficult to carry out economic growth in Latin 
America on the basis of an economic nationalist  strategy of import substitution. 
Nor was export-orientation  in the cards. One reason was that, in contrast to the 
East Asian NIC’s,  the United States was not really interested in favouring the 
development of the region by opening its home market to exports from these 
countries; neither did it favour the implementation of an agrarian reform which 
could have vitalized the internal market for the locally produced industrial goods. 
Secondly, the internal conditions were different than those in South Korea and 
Taiwan who, as former Japanese colonies, did not have as well entrenched 
agrarian elites as those of South America. The latter were uninterested in an 
overhaul of the rural structures and industrialization. Thus the weakness of the 
domestic market affected industrial development in a negative direction. 
While the experience of East Asian economic nationalism shows that the role of 
state dirigisme of the economy and society is important in conjunction with 
foreign trade opportunities, without the geopolitical interest of the United States –
as leader of the international system—the export-led growth of these economies 
would have found the world economy less conducive to their project. 
 
GLOBALISATION AND THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE THINKING 
Before concluding this discussion of the problem and strategy of capitalist 
economic development in a historical and geopolitical perspective it may be of  
heuristic value  to return to the issue of globalisation: to what extent  have we 
entered a new world order in which the notion of “uneven development” has 
become superseded, and to what extent does the liberalization of the world market 
serve the interests of all participants in the global economy? 
The results of the policies  of neoliberalism, which in the past twenty years have 
had a dominant position, need to be compared with the previous era when 
Keynesian macroeconomics and economic nationalism were dominant. According 
to the neoliberalist doctrine, the rate of growth of the global economy ought to 
have increased as a result of market liberalization. But the factual evidence shows 
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that during the 1960’s and 1970’s when the world was characterized by much 
greater national protectionism and other regulations of trade and capital 
movement, the world economy was nevertheless growing at a stronger pace than 
was the case in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  
The implementation of the discourse and strategy of neoliberalism by the 
developed centres of world capitalism offers a typical example of doublespeak: 
although the explicit aim of neoliberalism was to “liberate” the market from 
political interventionism in the industrialized countries,  it was primarily Third 
World nations that were  targeted to submit to unfettered capitalism by reducing  
the role of the state and  liberalize their economies. The upshot is that while 
developing countries were left defenceless vis-à-vis the world economy, the US, 
the EU together with Japan (the so-called TRIAD) have been  using state policies 
to intervene with the workings of a liberal global market. By subsidizing  their 
agriculture and industrial production and raising barriers to the free flow of goods, 
instead of opening their markets to the exports of developing countries, they don’t 
practice what they preach. The economies of the Third World thus have to operate 
on a non-levelled playing field and are put at a great disadvantage. Oblivious of 
the fact that it is the United States who is the largest debtor country, the IMF-
initiated Structural Adjustment Programs dictate economic policies of Third 
World debtor countries by enforcing the opening of their markets and 
liberalization of their economies - ironically measures which  necessitate political 
intervention by the state! 
On the basis of this interpretation of the paradoxes of economic development and 
international relations, a conclusion imposes itself especially if we seek a 
reduction of pauperisation and polarization in the world. The legitimacy of such 
an endeavour is accepted at the discourse level by both proponents and opponents 
of neoliberal globalisation. Consequently, transparency should be applied to the 
analysis of the experience of historical capitalism. The politics of economic 
nationalism in the catching-up process should be treated in an appropriate manner 
so as to offer developing countries a choice. Forcing them to follow an economic 
course which was not followed by the industrialized countries themselves raises 
the level of antagonism as the “ladder is kicked away” by the centres of 
capitalism. The notion  of  development under conditions of an (il)liberal global 
economy becomes  an ideological construct which serves the interests of those 
already developed at the expense of the late-comers! 
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In addition, yet another aspect related to late development under globalisation 
needs to be taken into consideration. Throughout the evolution  of capitalism, 
damage to nature has been externalised from economic calculations by not being 
conceptualised as  of  cost of production. Under these circumstances resources 
were not  considered to be limited or finite. This is not sustainable as  this element 
will increasingly affect the future geoeconomics and geopolitics of mature 
capitalism. Besides the problems at the level of the international political 
economy, the root of the new challenge which will increasingly impose itself is 
whether nature will be able to accommodate the rapacity with which the global 
economic system contributes to the depletion of the planet’s natural resources and 
creates environmental problems. In the last instance, what is at risk is the survival 
of the life-support system for humankind! 
The paradox is that the “overdeveloped” societies need to constantly boost 
economic growth in order to keep their  socio-economic and political system from 
breaking down. This translates into a lopsidedness whereby approximately 20% of 
humanity consumes 80% of the planet’s resources. The question that arises is 
whether it is possible to mobilize at least four times more extra resources to raise 
the consumption level of the remaining 80% of the world’s population to the same 
level if global harmony can be achieved. 
Common sense dictates  scepticism. Neither economic (neo)liberalism nor 
economic nationalism have been preoccupied with this existential problematique. 
The same can be said for socialist productivism. This notwithstanding, the need 
for  alternative theories and practices  to  developmentalism  is increasingly  felt 
and propagated by social forces and movements outside the realm of mainstream 
thinking and activities. Witness the yearly meetings of the World Social Forum 
which are organized by grassroots movements in opposition to the World 
Economic Forum whose meetings gather the world elite in Davos every year. 
The stakes are high and pessimism about the evolution of the world is not 
unwarranted. Without an alternative viable mode of organizing production and 
way of life on a world scale, the march towards barbarism may be shorter than 
realized.   
With this concern in mind, it is to be hoped that research and teaching programs in 
Development and International Relations at Aalborg University will keep 
identifying with the  imperative of alternative thinking and strive to be part of the 
solution rather than part of the problem. 
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Abstract   
US hegemony has been the most significant aspect of international relations since 
the fall of the Soviet Union. The past decade has seen the majority of the world 
shift under the cultural, economic and military influence of the US. This 
staggering and as yet unchecked power is in large part gained not through 
coercion but through persuasion. This ability to convince other actors in the world 
to act in a way that is beneficial to US interests is consistent with traditional 
Gramscian notions of hegemony. The content of the global media, as one of the 
primary disseminators of the hegemon's message inside civil society, should 
provide insight into the overall debate occurring within it.  Thus an examination 
of the content of the global media leading up to the recent US invasion of Iraq 
could provide some insight into the relative strength of the global hegemon. The 
results of this study clearly suggest that the US’s “power to define” is in decline 
and that the hegemon is in the midst of a crisis of authority that could be a sign of 
its irreversible decay.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There can be little argument that today’s world is one that is effectively 
dominated by one massive superpower. The United States of America is now 
responsible for more than a third of the global economy and has an unrivalled 
military, spending more on its armed forces than the next dozen countries 
combined (The Economist 2003:4). As Niall Ferguson (2003:8) recently wrote in 
Newsweek, “The United States is now an empire in all but name”.  
The US currently spends approximately 399 billion dollars per year on its 
military, nearly seven times that of Russia and 285 times larger than that of Iraq, 
the country it has invaded twice since it took on the role of the world's lone 
hegemon (CDI 2003). Economically, the US is similarly dominant as its 10.4 
trillion dollar economy constitutes more than 32% of the world’s GDP (World 
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Bank 2003). In fact, the US economy is roughly the same size as the rest of the 
G7 countries combined, and excluding those G7 countries, it is about the same 
size as the rest of the world’s economies collectively (Hofstra 2002). Politically, 
this dominance is seen in the leading role the US has taken in all realms of 
international relations, from brokering the Israeli/Palestinian peace process to 
effectively undermining the credibility of the International Criminal Court and the 
Kyoto accord by simply opposing them. In addition to this, the US is a veto-
wielding member of the Security Council and at the head of virtually every other 
significant international military or economic body from the WTO to NATO.  
Most significant for the purposes of this paper is the US’s dominance in the realm 
of culture and specifically the institutions that govern the global dissemination of 
information.  American, along with British companies, are the primary provider of 
films, music, television programming and most importantly news for the entire 
world (Magder 2003:31). In fact, in 2003 CNN alone reached more than 150 
million homes in 212 countries around the world (Thussu 2003:118).  
However, the pre-eminent position that the US now occupies, economically, 
militarily and politically around the world has its origins in the collapse of the 
Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War. Since the demise of the world’s only 
other superpower and the US’s main ideological rival, global public opinion has 
shifted towards the inherent “rightness” of the US worldview. It was generally 
believed by lesser developed nations that the way to success and prosperity was to 
emulate the US system and take an active role in the globalisation process.  As the 
US’s National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice (2003:104) recently described 
the situation, “Nations around the world share a broad commitment to democracy, 
the rule of law, a market-based economy and open trade”.  
In effect this shift meant that the majority of the world now agreed on how 
development could best be achieved. So in essence the US had not only won the 
Cold War but had in fact won over the hearts and minds of a great many of the 
world’s people and governments and created a globally shared world view.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the 
alliance of markets and foreign policy seemed triumphant. ‘Globalisation’ 
was on everyone’s lips. The American vision would spread – though 
perhaps slowly – everywhere as more nations fell under its sway 
(Samuelson 2003:44). 
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In reality, it is the fact that so much of the world gravitated towards this American 
world view, that has largely given the world’s only superpower its strength over 
the last fifteen years. It was believed that by adopting capitalist-market 
economies, liberal democracy and principles of free trade, the “have-nots” of the 
world would one day be able to join the “haves” as developed nations (Ibid). This 
“Washington Consensus” was largely believed to be the most fortuitous and 
expedient path to development and in turn impacted the soft power that the US 
held. 
This power that the US is now largely thought to wield, in all areas of global-
international relations, was described by Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci as 
hegemony. Gramsci defines hegemony as the “process of moral, philosophical, 
and political leadership that a social group attains only with the active consent of 
other important social groups” (Artz & Murphy 2003:1).  In this way, a 
hegemonic class,2 (in this case the United States) by owning and controlling the 
means of production and capital, including mental production in the form of the 
media,3 are able to support their hegemonic position. Traditionally, hegemonic 
classes are thought of as a part of the state level of analysis. However, for the 
purposes of this discussion hegemony will be examined on the macro or 
international level, and in this scenario, it is the US that occupies the position of 
hegemonic elite.  
From a Gramscian perspective, real power is not achieved through the use of 
coercive force but rather through convincing the world to see things the way the 
hegemon wants them to, thereby creating a shared “common sense” (Hallin 1994: 
59).  It is this shared common sense that led most of the developing nations of the 
world to follow Washington's advice in many areas of economic development and 
has also contributed greatly to the “real” as well as “soft” power that the US has 
enjoyed in recent years.     
 
2 At this point it is necessary to briefly discuss and define the concept of class that will be 
operationalised throughout this paper. While it may be true that the traditional class struggle defined 
by Marx may be obsolete in the classic bourgeois, proletariat sense, it can still be said that the world is 
made up of a group that has power and several other groups that have that power impressed upon 
them. It is this situation consisting of a hierarchical strata of power that we speak of when we talk of 
ruling or elite classes and subservient classes throughout this paper. 
3 Throughout this paper the term “media” will be used as a singular noun defined by the Oxford 
Dictionary 5th Edition (1995:727) as “The main means of communicating with large numbers of 
people, especially television, radio and newspapers”.  
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The adoption of this American common sense by the majority of the world has 
allowed the US to use more than just its military or economic superiority to 
achieve its current position as the world’s most powerful nation. It has allowed 
them to use the proverbial carrot more often than the stick when attempting to get 
their way in international relations. However, this system can last only as long as 
the audience that is subjected to it agrees to buy into the worldview that they are 
handed. And for this to happen, they must believe that either the system is 
benefiting them or that they have no choice. Change inside this system can occur 
only when the dominant worldview of the hegemonic elites (in this case the US) 
begins to break down. This ability to convince others to do as the hegemon desires 
without coercion is possibly the most significant aspect of US power.  
It is argued that one of the ways that the US is able to create this shared world 
view, and maintain its status as global hegemon, is through the use of the 
Western-based global media system. Most of the world’s information flows from 
the US outward and this propagation of Western based ideas throughout the world 
is one of the most powerful ways of Americanising global public opinion (Magder 
2003:31).  This is a system which, when functioning properly, can give the US the 
unprecedented power to make other global actors think that their interests and 
those of the hegemon are one in the same. This is hegemonic leadership as 
expressed by Lee Artz (2003, p.16-17): 
Leadership only becomes hegemonic because they convince others to 
become allies through persuasive political and cultural practices, which 
necessarily require normalized interpretations best communicated to the 
masses via the media. Hence, capitalist hegemony needs parallel media 
hegemony as an institutionalised, systematic means of educating, 
persuading, and representing subordinate classes to particular cultural 
practices within the context of capitalist norms. If culture is the 
ideological cement of society, then, to secure corporate interests, 
capitalist globalisation needs media hegemony to recruit, tame, and 
popularise interpretations, information and cultural behaviour 
complementary to deregulation, privatisation, and commercialisation.  
In other words, the global media system is one of the most powerful ways that the 
US maintains its control of global power through the creation of shared ideas and 
goals. It is this media system that serves as one of the greatest tools inside the 
hegemonic process as outlined by Gramsci (1971:177-185). 
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It is important to note here that truly hegemonic leadership also presupposes a 
claim by the hegemon that they are in effect acting in the interest of everyone. 
Based on our earlier assumption that the US is the world’s dominant hegemon, 
this begs the question of whether or not the US is claiming to act in the interest of 
all the subservient groups it controls.  In other words, does the US, at least 
outwardly, assume to act in the interests of all the nations in the world? The 
rhetoric of US President George W. Bush as he recently addressed the National 
Endowment for Democracy at the US Chamber of Commerce would seem to 
suggest that the answer to this question is a resounding yes. In his statement, 
where he justifies the invasion of Iraq, Bush expresses how the US is framing its 
actions as beneficial for the world as a whole.  
In fact, the prosperity, and social vitality and technological progress of 
a people are directly determined by extent of their liberty. Freedom 
honours and unleashes human creativity -- and creativity determines the 
strength and wealth of nations. Liberty is both the plan of Heaven for 
humanity, and the best hope for progress here on Earth (Bush 2003). 
This is not to say that these actions are in the best interest of the other actors in the 
world, but it does suggest that this is how the US is attempting to sell these 
actions to the global community. Therefore, the US would certainly fit the 
traditional notion of a hegemonic group, which uses institutions such as the 
media, and occasionally compromises some aspects of control, to make the 
subordinate classes feel the system is working to their advantage. 
However, some chinks may be starting to appear in this US-led global hegemony. 
Politically, the world’s only superpower appears to be becoming less and less 
influential in the world’s “soft power” game, which simply stated, is the ability to 
make people do what you want without using force (Magder 2003:30-32). This 
apparent weakness can be seen in the US’s failure to convince the world that its 
recent invasion of Iraq was justified, and in its apparent inability to peacefully 
rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan (Ferguson 2003:11). These difficulties point to a 
serious weakness in the perceived supremacy of the US military while similar 
failures in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process point to a possible weakening of 
the US’s ability to effectively use “soft power” to achieve their policy objectives. 
In addition to this, a seemingly softened US stance when dealing with so called 
rogue states like North Korea, Syria and Iran seems to be emerging, which could 
also point to a perceived loss of power. 
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…gone is the tough talk toward Syria. On Iran, too, the administration 
has increasingly deferred to the United Nations and international 
Atomic Energy Agency. Even on North Korea, Bush has softened his 
adamant refusal to negotiate any kind of deal before Pyong-Yang gives 
up its nuclear program (Hirsh 2003: 34).  
Economically, there also appear to be signs of weakness in the hegemon. Some 
analysts have suggested that a sinking dollar and a strengthening Euro may mean 
that the US’s number one position in the global economy could one day come into 
question. Furthermore, many of the poor countries of the world that believed US-
inspired governments and economies to be the path to development success have 
been sorely disappointed. As the gap between the rich and the poor countries of 
the world continues to widen, some evidence of this failure can be found inside 
the sole remaining superpower’s vanquished Cold War foe: “As for Eastern 
Europe and Russia - the formerly second world - shock-therapy privatisation 
directed by Harvard-educated economists has brought a ‘total economic 
collapse’” (Kagarlitsky 1997:19). The result of this collapse has been that more 
than ten times as many children in this region now live in poverty than while 
under Soviet rule and the “reasonable” standard of living that could be expected 
under the former Soviet government has now disappeared (European Children’s 
Trust 2000:14). Signs of dissenting voices can also be seen in the growing anti-
globalisation movements that have caused a stir at WTO meetings in Seattle and 
Quebec City in recent years as well as in the emergence of the G21 inside the 
WTO and the defection of traditional Western allies.  
These examples could be seen as a realization that US power is finite and that the 
empire is overextended (Hirsh 2003:34). It seems at least possible that certain 
segments of the world are beginning to reject the US common sense that has 
dominated unchallenged for the last decade and a half.  
This possible loss of strength for the American hegemon could be perceived as a 
weakening of the persuasive power of the dominant US world view or as Sardar 
(1999) put it, a weakening of the hegemon’s “power to define” and therefore its 
hegemonic power inside global civil society.4 This last point is crucial since it is 
 
4 Throughout this paper the notion of civil society will refer to Gramsci’s definition as it pertains to the 
hegemonic process. This is defined as the area where common sense is developed through discourse 
between institutions that are somewhat autonomous from the state (e.g. media, education system, and 
churches) Global civil society will be understood to be this arena taken outside state borders (Baylis & 
Smith 2001:210). 
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discourse within this civil society that generates the consensus that gives the 
hegemon its strength. Further to this, since the media is one of the most important 
ways a hegemon defines its worldview, it is reasonable to assume that a decline in 
the relative power of the hegemon could be visible inside the global media 
construct. It is with this in mind that the basis for this article was conceived.  
In short, if the United States is the dominant hegemonic force in the world and the 
Western-based media helps to facilitate that hegemonic process and strengthen it, 
then, if systemic change is going to occur, some change in global media content 
should be identifiable. So, if the US is losing its hegemonic control and it’s 
globally accepted world view is beginning to be questioned, then this shift should 
be reflected inside civil society and therefore inside the media.  
This problem is both interesting and relevant because the current US hegemony 
has been defining what is talked about not only around the table at the Security 
Council but also around dinner tables from Philadelphia to New Delhi. That is 
because this dialogue is in some very significant ways being shaped by the 
Western-based media from which it often emanates. So, if this conversation, and 
the terms it is being discussed in, is created by the West, it is likely leaving out the 
interests of those in the Eastern and Southern reaches of the globe.  This is 
particularly relevant given world events following September 11th 2001, as the 
US and its “Coalition of the Willing” have since effectively conducted diplomacy 
via the barrel of a gun, despite a general global consensus that these actions were 
wrong.  
The general purpose of this article is to apply Gramsci’s hegemonic theory to an 
empirical analysis of media content leading up to the recent invasion of Iraq. Due 
to the fact that the media is an integral part of the public sphere, it is assumed that 
a greater understanding of the current dialogue going on in civil society can be 
achieved through this process. It is hoped that a comparative analysis of the media 
prior to the recent invasion of Iraq could allow for some speculation about the 
health of US global hegemony when compared with similar studies of the media 
prior to the first Gulf War. 
 
GLOBAL MEDIA AND GLOBAL HEGEMONY 
The media is a major player in the creation and dissemination of the hegemon’s 
worldview. Therefore, if the media is failing to adequately relay the hegemon’s 
message then this could provide an indication that the hegemon’s real power is in 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 
 28  
decline. This could then provide an indication that the circumstances for the 
potential defection of “historic blocs” and the creation of a counterhegemonic 
movement are in fact in existence. Antonio Gramsci spoke about the need for 
historical blocs to come together in order to create a hegemonic or 
counterhegemonic force (although he never specifically used the latter term). This 
article will analyse the role of global media in this hegemonic process and see if 
there is in fact the potential for a counterhegemony to emerge through opposing 
historic blocs. This question will be addressed methodologically through an 
analysis of the global media through the critical lens of hegemonic theory.  
It is often argued in the analysis of hegemonic theory that the media is an 
institution used by elites to exercise their hegemonic power. According to Thomas 
Gitlin “the mass media produce fields of definition and association, symbol and 
rhetoric, through which ideology becomes manifest and concrete” (1980:2-3). It 
can be extrapolated from this that forces of counterhegemony could also utilize 
the media in this fashion. If this is the case, signs of an emerging 
counterhegemony could be spotted by searching for elements of a rejection of the 
dominant power and its message inside the global mass media construct.  
The analysis of differing forms of media and how they react to and report on 
certain events, can provide a number of insights into how this institution is 
manipulated by powerful elites, as they attempt to control or “spin” public 
perception. Ciaran McCullough expresses this relationship between media and its 
reliance on ruling elites in his book Media Power: “…certain groups in society are 
recognized by the media as accredited sources, and as such they have privileged 
access to (and greater claims on) media coverage. Their access comes from their 
institutional power, their representative status, or their claims to expert 
knowledge” (McCullough 2002:68). 
In other words the media is constructed in such a way that it is more apt to follow 
the lead of “legitimate” elites than of dissenting voices. This is not to say that 
there is not debate within the elite class. However, there are certain underlying 
principles that are consistent within the elite class and it is these similarities that 
make up the core of the elite’s worldview. For example, there may be debate 
inside the elite class about how best to spread liberal capitalism and democracy 
around the world, but there is no debate about whether or not it should in fact be 
disseminated. In other words, there is no “macro” argument about the validity of 
the liberal capitalist system, even if there is an ongoing “micro” debate about how 
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it is to be implemented. Thus the overriding message that is transmitted to the 
media by the elite class remains the same.  
This relationship, arguably stemming from the economic and cultural framework 
around the media (Herman & McChessney 1997), makes the analysis of media a 
key component when examining hegemony in the twenty-first century. It suggests 
that media content can often reflect the ideas and positions of hegemonic elites 
rather than of the many differing viewpoints inside global civil society. 
Having said this, it was determined that an analysis of the content of certain 
players in the global media system could shine a critical light on this hegemonic 
process. As a time frame for this study we chose the week leading up to the most 
recent conflict in Iraq. This time line was selected for two primary reasons. First, 
it allowed for an examination of a case where the world’s primary hegemonic 
power was attempting to set limits and define the context of global debate about a 
single issue. Second, in 1991 there was a similar military conflict in Iraq that 
could be cross-referenced in relation to the relative growing or shrinking of the 
hegemonic entity’s power to define (Sardar 1999:44; McCullagh 2002:15) . 
Of course these two instances are not identical. The 1991 conflict was backed by a 
UN resolution and involved an Iraqi invasion of a sovereign nation. This 
difference could be explained by a lack of persuasive ability by the hegemon 
inside the Security Council and in the public sphere (both aspects of global civil 
society) but the fact remains that it is still a difference. However, there are 
certainly enough similarities to assume that some cross analysis could be useful. 
By doing this, we hoped to gain an insight into the relative control that the world’s 
primary hegemonic power, The United States of America and its allies, had during 
this period. 
For the purposes of this study seventeen daily newspapers from different regions 
of the globe as well as four major broadcast news networks (24/7) were analysed.5 
A combination of regional, political, and circulation/penetration considerations 
 
5 Empirical sources from the US were: USA Today, International Herald Tribune, CNN, and Fox 
News.  Sources from the UK were: BBC Online, The Guardian, and the Independent.  Sources from 
Australia were: The Australian, and Canberra Times.  Sources from Asia and Africa were: Izvestia 
(Russia), The Hindu (India), The People’s Daily (China), The Daily Yomiuri (Japan), Arab News 
(Saudi Arabia), Al-Jazeera Network (Qatar), and The African Times (South Africa).  Sources from the 
Americas were: Toronto Star (Canada), and The Buenos Aires Herald (Argentina).  Sources from 
Europe were: Le Monde (France), FAZ (Germany) and Politiken (Denmark).  All sources were 
examined for the period March 13-19, 2003.   
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were used to determine the sample, which included at least one paper from six of 
the world’s continents and incorporated the use of five languages and more than 
five hundred individual samples. 
The concept of framing was central to our analysis of the content of these media 
outlets and requires further explanation at this point. Our analysis was based on 
the framing theory outlined by Robert Entman (1991). Entman says frames 
construct meaning in communication messages (articles and TV news stories) by 
asking four basic questions:  
  1) What is the problem that is being reported on?  
  2) What is the cause of the problem?  
3) Who is to blame or praise?  
  4) What is to be done or what is going to happen?  
 
Framing works by using language to send the reader or viewer a specific message 
and “[t]he use of particular words to describe events and issues represents not 
merely the choice of a descriptive phrase but also the choice of an attitude towards 
the event or issue” (McCullagh 2002:23). Some examples of words or phrases 
found in this analysis that can be considered frame markers are “dictator” (in 
reference to President Saddam Hussein), “defiant” (in reference to actors) or 
“collateral damage” as a euphemism for civilian casualties. It is the inherent 
meaning of these “loaded” terms that helps to send a specific message to the 
reader/viewer of a story. This message can often carry significantly different 
meanings based on the language it uses. For example, the US administration 
would much rather see a debate about the human costs of conflict framed in terms 
of “collateral damage” rather than in terms of the number of “dead women and 
children”. This is how the story is framed or in media-speak, it is the “spin” that 
the content has been given. In this way, the media does not tell people precisely 
what to think but does tell them what to think about and through loaded language 
provides a rough ‘frame’ for that debate. 
This concept of framing means that the media works as a tool to get a given 
agent’s message across to an audience. This analysis consisted of a careful 
reading of the selected articles covering the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq on 
March 19, 2003, followed by an identification of the ‘frames’ they contained.  
This question of framing will be addressed by answering the four questions 
outlined by Entman and listed above.  Operationally, for the purpose of this study 
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we have listed ten categories6 that answer Entman's first question: what is the 
problem. This choice was justified by the fact that our categories were generally 
taken from Wilhelm Kempf's analysis of the media during the first Gulf War 
(Kempf 1996:2-10).  Therefore, this choice would provide a fairly consistent 
framework for a comparison and cross-referencing of these two somewhat similar 
events. 
Today’s current environment sees one hegemonic power, the US, often working 
to control or frame the way the entire world talks about and views certain issues. 
Of course it is an over-simplification to say that there is one simple and overriding 
ideology operating within the United States. There are a number of variations on 
the basic principles that encompass the American worldview. In this sense the US 
is a pluralist nation with a wide variety of views on how to tackle the specific 
micro problems that it encounters.  
However, on a purely macro level there can be no doubt that in the international 
arena the US acts as a unitary actor displaying one set of concrete core 
assumptions and beliefs. These include an unwavering support for the general 
pillars of liberal democracy, capitalist free market economies and transparent and 
democratically elected governments. In other words, agents inside the US may 
argue how it is best to spread these concepts throughout the world but they rarely, 
if ever, question the actual validity of these core ideas (at least not significantly). 
One example of this agenda is that “[a] global media culture is likely to embody 
many western capitalist values such as the free market, consumerism, 
individualism and commercialism” (Jones & Jones 1999:225-232). 
Those values, based on core assumptions and beliefs, may not be the same ones 
shared in every country, but since “[m]ore and more people across the globe are 
receiving the same message from the same centre of commercial power” (Ibid), 
the global community is subjected to and influenced by those values and beliefs. 
 
6 The ten categories, based roughly on the previous study done by Kempf (1996), are: (1) weapons of 
mass destruction; (2) effectiveness of the UN, focussing specifically on discussions in the security 
council; (3) US unilateralism and/or imperialistic actions; (4) the global economy and the impact of a 
potential conflict on it; (5) domestic spin, that is, the political or economic impacts an invasion would 
have for individual states; (6) “war on terrorism” and its relationship to Iraq, including articles 
mentioning 9/11 or Al-Queda link to Iraq; (7) coalition building, specifically regarding a second UN 
resolution or the debate over the validity of an invasion; (8) technical or logistical aspects of war; (9) 
human rights and potential suffering resulting from an invasion; and (10) miscellaneous or other 
themes.  Note that while many categories may have been mentioned inside any given article, the cause 
was attributed to the category referred to most prominently throughout the text. 
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In other words, state boundaries are becoming more and more porous and 
vulnerable to the ideas and symbols of the information providers, making them 
much less culturally self-contained (Webster 2003:59). This shift in how 
worldviews are created and disseminated has been assessed by some as: 
The universal mode of address may be achieved through a dilution of 
values from a specific culture (often a Western, middle class mode of 
talking such as CNN) and a unique form of address may be achieved 
through a specific combination of universally acceptable symbols…. 
Thus, global media are capable of bridging the gap between the 
universal and the specific, although they often do so by using a 
somewhat artificial format (Stald & Tufte 2002:83).   
Therefore, understanding the way this international media system works now 
carries even greater significance when attempting to understand power and 
hegemony in a global context. 
Pragmatically speaking, there can be no doubt that the majority of what we call 
global media is based in the West and more specifically in the United States. 
“Western countries predominate in the flow of news and information…and of the 
Western countries, the United States is easily the most dominant entity in every 
facet of the world communication system” (Magder 2003:31).  The truth of this 
statement is underlined by the fact that “the United States exports more media 
products to more places globally than does any other country” (Ekachai, Greer & 
Hinchcliff-Pelias 1999:146).   
However, global media outlets are still controlled by the same elites who held this 
power when the media was state centric. So, in essence, a small group of wealthy 
Westerners are controlling the flow of information for the majority of the world. 
And for the most part they still operate with the same fundamental goals in mind, 
simply carried over to the international scene. In other words, they are market-
driven businesses, which must adhere to the demands of a fast-paced and 
competitive media industry. Therefore, the global media is providing a bridge 
between the hegemonic state’s local issues and the consciousness and worldview 
of the rest of the planet (Silverstone 2002:107).  Thus, it seems clear that the 
entire non-Western world is receiving news that originates (at least partly) outside 
of its state borders and is disseminated through the filter of a major Western 
media corporation. It can thereby be inferred that this “news” arrives pre-
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packaged, accompanied by its own ideologies, assumptions and views about the 
world. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE MEDIA DURING THE TWO GULF WARS 
Initially, all twenty-one of our media sources were examined together to glean 
macro results about how the war in Iraq was framed.  Then they were broken 
down in specific ways in order to discern micro results. Firstly, we wanted to 
observe the way in which the US and, to a lesser extent, the other countries in the 
“Coalition of the Willing” tried to justify the invasion of Iraq.  Secondly, we 
wanted to examine the way the media of the world presented their news stories 
and how they framed them. 
These questions were primarily answered by examining the responses to the two 
questions, what is the cause of the problem and who is to blame.7  However, prior 
to examining the specific results of this most recent study it is useful to look at 
some of the findings from media studies of the first US-led invasion of Iraq in 
1991. 
In Wilhelm Kempf 's 1996 study of media content during the first Gulf War he 
found that the US-led coalition is blamed 38.8% of the time, while Iraq is blamed 
in 61.2% of the articles (Kempf 1996:4-5). Kempf found that the media primarily 
blamed Iraqi aggression as the cause of the war and that this explanation was 
rarely or never questioned. Iraq’s claim of having historical rights over Kuwait’s 
territory was often mentioned, but its credibility was usually doubted or denied. 
The media spent very little time trying to explore the possibility of the anti-Iraq 
coalition being motivated by the same selfish interests ascribed to Iraq. On the 
contrary, the press depicted the members of the coalition as acting with the main 
purpose of liberating Kuwait and only rarely was the alliance suspected of acting 
to secure a supply of oil and stabilize petroleum prices around the world. So, from 
these results it can be inferred that the US hegemon had a secure grip over the 
global public perception of the conflict. 
 
7 “Who is to blame” is divided into five categories: (1) US/UK and the “coalition of the willing”; (2) 
Iraq/Saddam Hussein; (3) Unwilling and active opposers [e.g. France, Russia, Germany, Canada] (4) 
UN i.e. the ineffectiveness or powerlessness of it; (5) Neutral/miscellaneous i.e. articles neutral in their 
views or blaming other nations or actors not mentioned above.  See previous footnote for 
categorisation of causes. 
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A similar study by Nohrstedt and Ottosen found the following attitude patterns 
towards main actors in the first Gulf War.  
TABLE 1. ATTITUDE PATTERNS TOWARDS MAIN ACTORS IN FIRST GULF WAR  
 
ACTORS 
% Positive % Negative % Balanced 
George Bush 20 4 76 
Saddam Hussein 4 34 62 
Mikhail Gorbachev 12 4 84 
John Major 13 0 87 
Francois Mitterand 8 8 84 
J. Perez de Cuellar 10 0 90 
Norman Schwarzkopf     40 1 58 
Bill Clinton 17 17 67 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000:192 
A conversion of the above table leaves us with an overwhelmingly positive 
attitude for the representatives of the 1991 anti-Iraqi coalition (total of 41 positive 
percentage points for its leaders, compared to just 12 negative), a positive attitude 
for the UN Secretary General (10 to 0), and a decidedly negative depiction of 
Iraq’s President (34 to 4). In general, Nohrstedt and Ottosen find that media in the 
first Gulf War never actually strayed too far away from the hegemon’s 
propaganda line. 
Nohrstedt and Ottosen suggest that “if the homeland of the media is involved in 
the conflict, news reporting is expected to function as a propaganda channel of the 
nation-state” (2000:250). However, there may be varying degrees of support for a 
conflict (from the media) depending on the significance that the conflict has for 
the nation in question. If the dominant superpower is an actor in the conflict, its 
propaganda is likely to find its way into news content and, by virtue of the power 
of the hegemon’s media, generally set the agenda for media around the globe. 
Thus, the dominant power’s propaganda is reiterated, wittingly or not, by all the 
rest. Nohrstedt and Ottosen also note that selective omission of events follows the 
same pattern of dependency on the hegemon’s interest (Ibid). The one thing that 
both of these studies seems to point to is that the US was able to “spin” the 
perception of the conflict around the world in its own terms and that the 
hegemon's power to define was alive and well. 
 34  
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These results are in stark contrast to those gathered from the study of media 
content prior to the most recent conflict in Iraq. Leading up to the United States' 
recent invasion of Iraq the US government attempted to frame the need for an 
invasion of Iraq in two ways.  One was the link the Bush administration tried to 
show between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction). 
The other was the connection between Iraq and the “War on Terror,” including 
implied links to Al-Quaeda, Osama Bin-Laden and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on 
the US.  The results in this recent study show that the media of the world 
(including the United States and its allies) actually used those two ways to frame 
their news very rarely, at 3% and 1% respectively (Chart 1).8 So, even though 
these two aspects were the main reasons that the US president and the Western-
based “Coalition of the Willing” gave for the invasion of Iraq, they were almost 
never discussed in the media. 
Instead, the world media was more apt to see the invasion and ensuing occupation 
linked to issues such as human rights abuses and US unilateralism.  In this way it 
is obvious that the US was not able to use their hegemonic power to convince the 
world to look at the conflict through their lens. In fact, the hegemon was often 
framed as the aggressor and as morally bankrupt. 
This study also investigated whether there was a decline in the ability of the US 
regime to both direct and deflect blame for the conflict away from themselves and 
towards other actors. The findings show quite clearly that while this was the case 
during the first Gulf War, it was certainly not the case this time. In fact even 
inside the US's own media, 21% of the stories blame the US and the Coalition of 
the Willing for the conflict in Iraq. This is more than the amount of blame put on 
the non-helpers (countries like France and Germany that opposed the war) at 17% 
and is only marginally higher than the 30% attributed to Iraq (chart 8). What can 
be deduced from this is that the US government was unable to set the agenda not 
only in the global media but also in its own back yard. 
The results of this blame game are even more illuminating when the entire world's 
media is taken into account. The global media, including the US and other 
coalition countries, blamed the US and the coalition in 45% of the stories, 
compared with Iraq at 17% (chart 3). Not surprisingly, the unwilling countries 
blamed the US in 56% of the stories and only blamed Iraq in 12% (chart 4). 
 
8 Statistical breakdowns of the media prior to the most recent Gulf War are presented in graph form at 
the end of the article.  
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Within the media of the “Coalition of the Willing”, countries who actually support 
the US in their case against Iraq, 40% of the articles put blame on the US, whereas 
Iraq is only blamed in 21% of the cases (chart 5).  The fact that Iraq is only 
blamed half as often as the US firstly suggests that the media within the coalition 
is not convinced by US attempts to frame Iraq as the problem. Secondly, it shows 
a trend in global public opinion going against the US, again showing that US 
credibility in the media and therefore inside civil society could be in decline. 
One major conclusion is clear from the results of this examination of the media. 
When compared to the studies of the last Iraq war an apparent decline in the US’s 
credibility is observed. This is clear because there has been a noticeable shift in 
the power of the US to define problems and attribute blame. Where in the first 
Gulf War Iraq was primarily blamed for the conflict, in this recent study it is the 
US that is primarily cast in a negative light. Also, and perhaps most important, the 
results suggest that there is dissent inside the US coalition and perhaps within the 
hegemon itself. 
 
ETHICAL VS. UNETHICAL HEGEMONS 
During the Cold War the US was cast in a competitive role against the other 
dominant hegemon of the time, the USSR. This meant that there was an inherent 
legitimacy or “rightness” to the US worldview as it was simply held up as a 
credible and logical alternative to global communism. This allowed the US to 
hold its subordinate blocs together simply by framing their positions as necessary 
to oppose the inherent wrongness of the “evil empire” (Mansbach 1994:414). This 
situation changed after the end of the Cold War as the US no longer had a natural 
enemy and their worldview had seemingly won out over the communist 
alternative. As Francis Fukuyama put it, the world had reached “the end of 
history” and the values of democracy and liberal-capitalism espoused by the West 
were now the only remaining legitimate worldview (Fukuyama 1992). This 
allowed the US and the Western democracies that made up the core of its 
hegemonic bloc to have a certain amount of leeway with the rest of the world. US 
common sense was assumed to be the path to development and progress around 
the world (Augelli & Murphy 1988: 125-140; Shaw 1994:11; Hallin 1994:59). 
The question that is to be posed at this time is whether or not that “honeymoon 
period” is over. It must now be asked whether the US has effectively acted as 
what Gramsci referred to as an ethical hegemon since the end of the Cold War. 
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However, before this question can be answered, a better understanding of the 
difference between ethical and unethical hegemonies is required. 
Gramsci describes an ethical hegemon as one that aspires and works to raise the 
subservient historic blocs under its control to its level (Augelli & Murphy 
1988:125-140). By this Gramsci means that the blocs that make up the hegemon’s 
power base must be lifted economically, politically and culturally to that of the 
elites. An unethical hegemon, in essence, is one that has failed to listen to the 
subservient blocs in global civil society. Thus, the dialogue between the hegemon 
and the blocs is one-way and top-down in nature. Gramsci says that if this 
happens, the blocs that have submitted to the hegemon, through discourse and 
compromise in civil society, begin to defect and reject the hegemon’s worldview. 
It is at this time that a hegemon can be considered to be unethical in nature (Ibid). 
To determine whether the US global hegemony is unethical or ethical is a 
subjective task at best. However, the simple fact that the economic and cultural 
disparity between the US and the majority of the world is growing, leads one to 
believe that a case could be made for the position that the US is in fact an 
unethical hegemon (McGrew 2000). 
Furthermore, the US has in the past stated that one of its goals was to maintain the 
economic disparity that exists in the world (Pilger 2003:120). Similarly, many of 
the international organizations and institutions that the US leads are often cited as 
helping to increase this gap between the US and the rest (Li 2001:51-57). These 
facts combine to make it a reasonable assumption that at least some of the blocs 
that make up the US hegemony may view their hegemon as unethical. It is only 
when the hegemon has been found to be unethical that a counterhegemony can 
potentially emerge (Downing 2001:15; Augelli & Murphy 1988:125).  
Conditions for an emerging counterhegemony are described as the point where 
historic blocs begin to defect from the hegemon and have the potential to come 
together in opposition to it (Ibid). At this time the defecting blocs will have to go 
through the same hegemonic process in state or global civil society where they 
suppress their micro goals and come together to focus on their common macro 
goal (Ibid). In this case that macro goal would be rising up and opposing the 
unethical hegemonic power of the US. The hegemon then has two choices: (1) it 
can make concessions and begin to listen to the subservient blocs, thereby 
assailing their concerns and reintroducing them into the hegemonic structure; or 
(2) it can ignore these demands. If the hegemon chooses to ignore them, the 
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subservient blocs will challenge the hegemon, who will in turn lose its power 
base.  
It has been suggested by some academics that the most likely time for structural 
change inside a system is during a time of crisis (Molotch & Lester 1974:235-
260). This is because during a crisis, events unfold unexpectedly and at too quick 
of a pace for the hegemon to adequately frame issues that are to be discussed in 
civil society (Ibid). The inability to adequately frame hegemonic discourse then 
leads to the emergence of more opposing views, which in turn diminishes the 
hegemon’s power to define (Hallin 1994:55). If this is the case, then this 
dissenting discourse should be observable inside the media during a time of crisis 
or conflict. It could be argued that with the current global situation, where there 
are a number of unpopular US-led conflicts, we have reached this time of crisis.  
This fact, combined with the knowledge that the media is one of the primary tools 
for discourse inside civil society, links the emergence of dissent in the media to 
the emergence of counterhegemony or at the very least, the possible defection of 
historic blocs. The question then becomes whether or not we are seeing signs 
inside the global media, and elsewhere, that this defection is indeed beginning to 
take place. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As previously stated, the general purpose of this article is to apply Gramsci’s 
hegemonic theory to an empirical analysis of media content leading up to the 
recent invasion of Iraq. Because the media is an integral part of the public sphere, 
it is believed that a better understanding of the current dialogue going on in civil 
society could be achieved through this process. It is hoped that a comparative 
analysis of the media prior to the recent invasion of Iraq could allow for some 
speculation about the health of US global hegemony. In theory, one would assume 
that an effective hegemon would be able to dictate the parameters of a debate 
inside global civil society in terms that they choose. The general picture formed 
from this empirical study of the media, is that there were and are several debates 
surrounding the war. In essence, the fact that there was no global consensus 
suggests that the US was unable to control the discourse leading up to the war and 
frame the situation to its advantage. It is also significant to note that when 
compared to the first conflict in Iraq the onus of blame allocated inside the global 
media has shifted. Where in the first Gulf War it was Iraq who shouldered the 
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majority of the blame, during the recent invasion it was the US that was primarily 
determined to be culpable. This fact alone suggests that the credibility and 
therefore the hegemonic power of the US could be in decline. 
 
In short, the debate reflected in the media does not follow the agenda put forth by 
the US and its allies. The WMD debate, which the “Coalition of the Willing” used 
as a pretext to invade Iraq, is a non-issue even to the majority of the media from 
the coalition itself. Japan is the sole exception, which might have to do with 
Tokyo’s own WMD concerns about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
Surprisingly, the WMD issue matters much more to Al-Jazeera and Arab News 
than to the rest of the media, excluding the Japanese-based Daily Yomiuri. 
Proximity and refutations could play a role in their concern with the topic. The 
alleged links between Iraq and different terrorist groups, another key reason given 
by the US for the invasion, are outright dismissed by the media, even in the US. 
The human cost of the eventual war ranks seventh among the ten categories in the 
study. Despite the efforts of the Toronto Star, Arab News and African News, the 
casualties of the coming war do not get much attention in the media.   
The topical analysis of the media in the scope of this study seems to give credence 
to the hypothesis that the hegemon and its allies, despite commanding an enviable 
media influence, were not able to swing the debate towards “their” issues. The 
results seem to pose the question, could this be the beginning of the end of the 
hegemon’s power to define? 
The analysis of the blame assigned to the actors in the political drama preceding 
the war seems to be consistent with such a view. The “Coalition of the Willing” is 
deplored in half of the articles. The articles that either divide the blame more or 
less equally between all sides or remain neutral come in second place. Iraq comes 
third in this order, being blamed for the conflict only one third as many times the 
“Coalition of the Willing”. The “unwilling”, that is Germany, France, Russia and 
company are the target of scorn in just one-tenth of the articles. The United 
Nations seem to attract the least criticism (less than 4 percent, while being the 
topic of nearly three times more stories), which seems to confirm the hypothesis 
from the topical analysis: people around the world question the global sheriff  (the 
US) more than the world city hall in the form of the UN. 
While it is not surprising to see Arab News as the primary carrier for criticism of 
the “willing”, it is worth noting that the coalition is getting some of its toughest 
treatment from the American International Herald Tribune the Danish Politiken, 
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the Canadian Toronto Star and the Australian Canberra Times. With Politiken and 
Canberra Times published in member countries of the anti-Iraqi coalition, the 
results seem to point to a significant fault line both between and within the 
countries comprising the West. The results seem to say that the US-led coalition 
was unable to convince its own media, let alone that of the world, of the rightness 
of its invasion. 
The defection of the majority of the West seems even more interesting given the 
backdrop of the careful pronouncements in the media from Russia and China. 
While generally disapproving of the US-UK push for war, Izvestia and People’s 
Daily acknowledge, both tacitly and explicitly, that confronting the US openly 
would be a mistake. Calculations of economic and geopolitical factors colour the 
debate in these media in pragmatic shades. Given that both Russia and China had 
their own concerns, like issues of terrorism, oil prices and trade relations, it is not 
surprising that the media in those countries remained fairly balanced in their 
critique of the situation.  
When these empirical results are analysed through the lens of hegemonic theory, 
some intriguing assumptions and conclusions can be made. It can be said that 
there has been a significant shift in global public opinion against the US between 
the last Gulf War and the current invasion of Iraq. It has also been shown that the 
US is the primary global hegemon.  Next, the way the US uses the media to 
disseminate its own worldview has been explained. Furthermore, the appearance 
of dissenting global opinions inside the world media has been shown to be a 
reflection of the discourse going on inside global civil society. 
If this is in fact the case, then one can assume that this dissent inside civil society 
could be an early sign of historic blocs underneath the US hegemony beginning to 
defect. In other words, we could be witnessing the decay of US hegemonic power. 
This does not mean that this decay is in any way permanent or irreversible, but it 
does mean that more and more the US is being framed as an unethical hegemon. 
This fact, combined with the global crisis presented by the ongoing situation in 
Iraq, could be said to provide the conditions for the coming together of these 
defecting blocs. Further to this point it can be said that this coming together of 
historic blocs is one of the early signs of a cohesive counterhegemonic force. 
However, having said this there are still a number of variables that would have to 
occur for this counterhegemonic scenario to play itself out. Firstly, these 
dissenting blocs would have to come together and put their individual concerns 
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aside in favour of focusing on their shared macro goal (opposing the unethical 
hegemon). This in and of itself is a monumental task that is almost impossible to 
comprehend, but it is a necessary condition for a counterhegemonic movement. 
Gramsci envisioned this process on a state level but since it has been shown that 
there is a global hegemon, these same requirements would have to be met on a 
global scale. Secondly, the US would have to ignore these dissenting blocs and 
fail to usurp their concerns and make them their own, thereby disrupting the 
cohesiveness and effectiveness of the counterhegemonic movement. Even so, it 
can certainly be said that the conditions are ripe for the emergence of a 
counterhegemonic force to confront the US global dominance. Due to this 
situation the hegemon is now faced with a critical foreign policy choice. The US 
can either begin to listen to the concerns of the blocs that make up their hegemony 
or they can ignore these criticisms and undermine their own legitimacy and power 
in the process. If the US begins to fail in the arena of consensus making inside 
civil society, the inherent rightness of their worldview comes into question and 
the universality of American common sense is undermined. How to confront this 
crisis of authority is one of the most important choices that the world’s only 
superpower and ruling hegemon will. This choice will determine whether or not a 
counterhegemonic force will rise to power, or if the US will hold onto or tighten 
its grip on the world. 
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RESULTS INTERPRETATION CHARTS9
 
CHART 1. TOPICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALL UNITS IN THE SAMPLE 
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5. Domestic Spin
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9. Human Cost
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10. Misc.
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8. Technical Aspects
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1. WMD 2. UN 3. US Imperialism 4. Global Economy 5. Domestic Spin
6. Terrorism 7. Coalition Building 8. Technical Aspects 9. Human Cost 10. Misc.
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9 The source for charts 1-5 and chart 8 is the authors’ own empirical data. 
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CHART 2. TOPICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE NEWS FROM US-BASED MEDIA 
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CHART 3. BLAME DISTRIBUTION FROM THE TOTAL SAMPLE 
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CHART 4. BLAME DISTRIBUTION - COUNTRIES OPPOSING THE US INTERVENTION 
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CHART 5. BLAME DISTRIBUTION FROM THE ‘COALITION OF THE WILLING’. 
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CHARTS 6 AND 7. BLAME DISTRIBUTION DURING GULF WAR 1991 
  
Who is to Blame, 1991? 
(Nohrstedt, 2000)
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CHART 8: BLAME DISTRIBUTION IN THE STORIES FROM US-BASED MEDIA. 
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INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: ANALYTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU 
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
Victor D. Bojkov*
 
Abstract: 
This article taps into the experience of creating regional human rights regimes in 
three different regions in order to extract certain commonalities that help create 
an analytical framework that is valid across the board. It then positions the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights into the so-constructed framework in order to 
examine the extent to which the two are compatible with each other. While the 
Charter clearly lends itself to analysis through reference to the framework’s four 
main dimensions – historical context, regional ethics, strong commitment to 
implementation and jus commune – it also introduces two additional ones. These 
stem from the particular context within which the Charter was created and are 
related to its purpose of legitimising the EU integration project and giving it a 
written constitutional form. Although the Charter presents itself as a peculiar case 
among the analysed regional human rights regimes, the article argues that on the 
most fundamental level its kinship with the family of international human rights 
instruments is uncontested. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The present article is an attempt to construct and operationalise a tentative 
analytical framework conceptualising the establishment of regional human rights 
regimes. For this purpose, it first draws upon the experience of three regions and 
the regimes they have established in order to extract the framework’s dimensions. 
Subsequently, the article takes up the case of the EU10 Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and searches for the possible analytical implications of its creation. Both 
levels, the regional and the sub-regional (i.e. the EU) are treated as locations in 
which sources of explanations for the observed phenomena, the creation of human 
                                                 
* Marie Curie Visiting Fellow at SPIRIT-Europe, Aalborg University. A special word of gratitude is 
due to Staffan Zetterholm who made valuable comments to an earlier draft of this article. 
10 Hereinafter referred to as the European Union, or the Union, regardless of the period. 
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rights regimes, can be found (Buzan 1995:199). In this sense, they are 
distinguished ontologically as being different units of analysis. The main purpose 
of the article is to establish whether they should also be distinguished along the 
second of Moul’s (1973:495) principles, epistemologically, as introducing 
different variables in explaining the particular outcome. 
Conceptually, the article bases itself on regime theory in international relations, 
broadened by the specificity introduced by the subject-matter of human rights 
regimes, and on the two  contrasting positions regarding the reasons and motives 
of states to create them. The purpose of the theoretical discussion is to come up 
with relevant analytical dimensions that help construct a conceptual framework 
for the analysis of regional human rights regimes. Although they exhibit a number 
of differences in terms of the type of rights they codify and the implementation 
mechanisms they contain, the article claims that they can be explained through 
reference to fundamental characteristics shared among them.  
Structurally, the article is divided in two parts. At the outset, the presentation is 
focused on the tenets of regime theory and the two resulting perspectives on the 
creation of human rights regimes. It is argued that the latter widen the scope of 
regime theory by introducing the notion of normative motivation drawing on a 
purportedly universalisable sense of justice besides the idea of self-interest. 
Subsequently, human rights regimes span this widened scope of regime theory as 
they are the outcome of varied calculations. It is thus possible to observe a 
combination of interest and ideology in any of them and this forms the 
fundamental background to their analysis. Through reference to three regional 
human rights regimes, the article defines four conceptual dimensions of such 
analysis: historical context, regional ethics, strong commitment to implementation 
and jus commune.  
In the second part, the article takes up the case of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in order to ascertain whether the so constructed analytical framework is 
adequate for its analysis or whether the Charter presents it with irreconcilable 
conceptual tensions. Although the Charter lends itself to discussion through 
reference to the four analytical dimensions, it also introduces two additional ones 
– legitimacy and constitutionalism. Because of the specificity of the European 
Union, any consideration of the Charter that does not incorporate the latter is 
necessarily incomplete. In view of this, the answer to the question posed in the 
second part of the article is negative. 
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REGIME THEORY AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
In international relations (IR), states often resort to regulating their cooperation in 
the form of specific regimes, which postulate the expected behaviour in given 
areas and ensure, with more or less rigour, that the norms they contain are 
complied with. The abundance of such regimes codifying the regulation of various 
sites where states’ interests meet and interact, ranging from the regulation of 
waterways navigation, through trade, monetary and environmental policies, to 
nuclear weapons non-proliferation, has given rise to a strand within IR thought 
dealing exclusively with their formation, functioning and place within the wider 
theoretical foundations of the discipline. Through its focus of study and the host 
of relevant insights generated thereof, regime theory has “made considerable 
progress in its own right” within the field of international relations (Buzan 
1993:328).  
 
REGIME THEORY 
Regime theory is the outcome of the analytical endeavour to articulate a concept 
that captures and explains the multiple patterns of interaction observed among 
states in their relations (Keohane and Nye 1977, Krasner 1983a, Keohane 1989a, 
Rittberger 1995, Hasenclever et al. 1996). One of the widest definitions of 
regimes sees them as “patterned behaviour” (Puchala and Hopkins 1983:26), thus 
encompassing an enormous set of phenomena in interstate interaction. Limiting 
those to the explicit agreement among governments within a given policy area, 
Keohane (1989b:4) defined regimes as “institutions with explicit rules, agreed 
upon by governments, which pertain to particular sets of issues in international 
relations”. The prevailing definition, however, was provided by Krasner (1983b:2) 
who was much more inclusive by claiming that international regimes are “implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.  
Although the last definition offered to widen the scope of regime contents by 
acknowledging the importance of principles and norms besides rules and 
considered them in their implicit character as well, Krasner preserved the 
overwhelming focus on material self-interest behind regime formation and 
functioning. For the latter to be effective and indeed possible, some sense of 
common interest was perceived as an indispensable condition. Young (1994) 
supported this claim in observing that, despite the acknowledged need for a 
regime regulating environmental policy, the divergence of economic goals 
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between industrialised and less developed nations makes its formation difficult. 
And since the interests underlying any regime are articulated in the structure of 
preferences within individual countries, the more convergence and overlap among 
them, the higher the success in implementing the regime (Milner 1997). 
All of the above inevitably invites the question of whether international human 
rights instruments should be considered within the framework of regime theory 
and whether, in fact. they deserve the label “regimes” at all. They do represent 
institutions with explicit rules agreed upon by governments, and they also imply 
the convergence of actors’ expectations, but do they really pertain to an area of 
international relations? Their subject matter being the regulation of relations 
between rulers and ruled within political communities,11 human rights instruments 
are perhaps more aptly categorised as a phenomenon of domestic-political rather 
than international-relations importance. However, on the account that by signing 
up to international human rights instruments governments accept a commitment 
towards the other government-parties to that instrument, the last claim is 
unreasonable and the natural belonging of such instruments to the area of 
interstate relations seems uncontested. With respect to this, human rights 
instruments naturally belong to the family of international regimes at a 
fundamental level: the fact of state acceptance of certain normative and procedural 
constraints as legitimate and of international authority replacing a certain area of 
the original national sovereignty (Donnelly, 1986:602). Human rights thus 
represent just another issue-area in which states choose to renounce parts of their 
sovereign national authority through an international regime, in order to reduce 
the costs of anarchy.   
It is in another related aspect, that their conceptualisation within regime theory is 
more problematic and here it is the theory that widens and adapts, rather than the 
idea of human rights instruments. Analysing them, Beitz (2003) posed the thesis 
that they do not only institutionalise existing interaction. On the contrary, being 
normative standards within various political arenas, they propagate change and 
ideals. Because of its nature, human rights codification attracts a host of 
normative thinking basing itself on a purportedly universalisable sense of justice 
rather than on the idea of self-interest. It is precisely the seeming irreconcilability 
between these two that Hurrell (1995) took as his cue in making the case for 
expanding the focus of regime theory. In his analysis, human rights codification 
 
11 According to Jones (1994:3), human rights developed in the mid-eighteenth century as political 
instruments fulfilling the function of checks upon political power. 
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came as a useful tool to conceptualise the relation between law and norms on the 
one hand, and power and interests on the other beyond the narrowing view of 
seeing the former as simply a reflection of the latter.  
The argument can be advanced in two steps. Firstly, the sustained interaction of 
states within the international system develops quasi-societal qualities by 
generating the interest of maintaining common rules and institutions often based 
on normative considerations (see Bull and Watson 1984). Secondly, the existence 
of such qualities of interaction, implying a degree of common identity among its 
actors, is indispensable for the creation and functioning of any regulatory regime 
(Buzan 1993). Within this idea, Hurell (1995) saw international law as the 
political foundation that is necessary before regimes can come into play. The 
degree of identity sharing in this sense ranges from the mutual recognition of 
sovereign actor-ness (minimal) to the acceptance of the fundamental values of the 
other as one’s own (maximal). This view is consistent with Kratochwil’s 
influential contentions that classic regime theory is characterized by an egregious 
lack of familiarity with legal theory (1984:344) and that the conception of law as a 
coercive order needs revision (1984:345). 
The above presents the case for widening the scope of regime theory by inserting 
normative considerations into the process of preference formation by participating 
actors. International human rights regimes12 create another pole in its 
categorisation structure where cooperation is prompted not exclusively by the 
states’ self-interest, but also by legitimate normative thinking resulting from their 
perception of shared identity and the need to preserve the established political 
order, both domestically and internationally. As much as human rights regimes 
are defined by material state interest (e.g. Britain and the regime of abolishing 
slave trade in the eighteenth century), they are also the product of defending 
shared values and principles, such as human life and human dignity - an especially 
relevant idea after the Second World War - and liberalism and democracy, 
carefully protected among Western European states after 1950. In other words, to 
discuss human rights in terms of regimes requires the important reconciliation of 
the convenient view that regimes lend structure to politics with the far less 
congenial position that rules lend structure to structure (see Onuf and Peterson 
1984:329).   
 
12 After the preceding discussion it is justified to label international human rights instruments 
‘regimes’. 
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The idea of human rights is plagued by difficult-to-reconcile debates at a number 
of levels. Firstly, the understanding of human rights as naturally belonging to 
individual human beings13 opposes the view that they only exist within codes 
agreed collectively that provide a corresponding duty, usually held by an 
authoritative institution.14 Secondly, and related to the above, human rights are 
contested with reference to their spatial applicability. One side, espousing 
Burton’s (1972) ideas on world society, holds that they are universally applicable 
across the globe. The other sees them as socially embedded and only making 
sense if emerging within a certain social context and corresponding to its 
particular conception of the “good life”. The latter view challenges the former’s 
individualist approach as socially destructive by arguing the need for a more 
community-oriented stance (Marx 1987).15 The third distinction refers to 
generations of rights, the most contested one discussing the relative importance of 
civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic and social rights on the 
other. It is a debate of primacy, within which one side holds that without civil and 
political rights no community of people at any level can achieve economic and 
social rights;16 the other side countering that without enjoying economic and 
social rights in the first place it makes no sense to possess the civil and political 
rights.17
 
13 The idea of natural rights is seen as directly linked to the concept of liberalism that evolved in 
Western political thought from the Enlightenment period onwards. Human rights are thus ‘natural’, 
conceived as a moral entitlement which human beings possess in their natural capacity as humans, and 
not by virtue of any special arrangement into which they have entered or of any particular system of 
law under which jurisdiction they fall (Finnis 1980). Locke is arguably the most prominent defender of 
the idea claiming that certain rights self-evidently belong to the individuals as human beings (see 
Locke 1990). 
14 Bentham held that human rights are “nonsense upon stilts” and a contradiction in terms if not 
established by a system of positive law with the corresponding duty of an institution of authority 
(Bentham 1987:53). Relatedly, Burke saw the proclamation of “natural rights” in declarations and 
charters as a socially dangerous and inadequate substitute for effective legislation (Burke 1790).  
15 The individualist approach was defended by Dworkin as a possibility to “trump” collective 
objectives which infringe on individual freedoms (Dworkin 1977: xii). Habermas (2001), on the other 
hand, argued that the very concept of rights makes sense only within a collectivity of individuals who 
agree through deliberation on their exact contents, scope and form. 
16 Sartori (1965) saw it as an inherent feature of any democratic political system that it is the most 
socially and economically vulnerable who will make full use of their civil and political rights in order 
to better their condition. For Cranston (1964, 1967:43-52), economic and social entitlements do not 
satisfy a number of conditions, which prevents one from qualifying them as rights proper.  
17 Beetham (1995:59) defended the view that corresponding duties for economic and social rights are 
assignable and practicable. Relatedly, Wieruszewski (1994:69) attacked the problem of whether 
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ANALYSING HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES 
Stemming from the above and vindicating human rights regimes as spanning a 
wide range of possible explanations as to their emergence, there exists most 
broadly two conflicting approaches to analysing them. One holds that states form 
such regimes out of altruistic and ideological reasons. It puts predominant stress 
on the power of ideas to reshape the understanding of national interest (Sikkink 
1993). The outcome is twofold: a willingness to surrender a degree of sovereignty 
and a preparedness to project human rights standards internationally. Through a 
process of transnational socialisation, helped by the inherent “logic of 
appropriateness” of human rights regimes, eventually all states see it as an 
important element of their membership in international society to sign up to them 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Because of the impact of principled ideas and 
norms on identities and interests, the “spiral model” of socialisation easily 
becomes self-sustainable after exerting international pressure solely defined by 
ideological reasoning on hesitant states (Risse and Sikkink 1999:17-35). 
Putting the emphasis on material interests, the other approach informed by realism 
in IR sees human rights as yet another instrument of pursuing geopolitical goals. 
Krasner, who defined international human rights regimes as mechanisms 
“designed to encourage some states to adopt policies that they would not 
otherwise pursue’ (1995: 140), claimed that ‘only when powerful states [had a 
material interest to] enforce principles and norms were [such] regimes 
consequential” (1995: 141).18  Relatedly, Miller (1979) saw human rights as mere 
interests in disguise - a view supported by Herman and Chomsky (1979) who 
accused the US of often abusing the language of human rights in order to ensure  a 
favourable investment climate abroad. Evans (2001) supported this claim by 
defining human rights as the outcome of politics, and human rights regimes as 
reflecting the interests of the hegemon in international relations. 
 
economic and social rights should be taken seriously at all with the problem of how to proceed once 
the inevitable agreement that they should be taken seriously had finally been arrived at. 
18 In his study Krasner took up four cases. Religious toleration was successfully imposed only in the 
17th century in areas where local rulers were too weak to resist (1995:144-52). Slave trade was 
abolished because major European powers, notably Great Britain, vigorously monitored and enforced 
the regime (1995:152-5). The protection of minority rights in Europe in the 19th and the beginning of 
the 20th centuries failed because the dominant powers were unwilling to enforce treaty provisions 
(1995:155-61). Finally, the modern regime of individual human rights protection has been only fitfully 
and incompletely accepted, because the most powerful advocates of universal human rights, such as 
the USA and West European states, have not had the resources and inclination to compel or entice 
recalcitrant states to accept such practices (1995:161-4).  
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It is obvious that the above two views are conflicting, but are they mutually 
exclusive? If human rights regimes do indeed span a wide range of categorisations 
within regime theory, e.g. explanations arising out of state interest and 
explanations arising out of their inherent logic of appropriateness, then it makes 
sense to identify analytical dimensions belonging to both sides in analysing any of 
them. Ignatieff (2001) recognised this duly in seeing the complex nature of human 
rights regimes as necessarily implying that different states join them for different 
reasons. Both the politics of interest and the power of ideas exist and are 
observable in different composition in the reasons of every state to become a 
contracting party to a certain human rights instrument. Because it is specific to the 
state parties, this analytical dimension is hard to capture in its totality for any 
given regime only by referring to the regime itself. It does, however, create a 
useful conceptual background to the effort of identifying and analysing four other 
explanatory factors that together establish a framework fit for application across 
the board.   
In the current state of affairs, there are a host of global international human rights 
instruments spread along the issue areas that they codify. Three of them, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the two International 
Covenants of 196619 form the core of the global human rights regime. The 
Covenants span the globe in having almost universal membership. In accordance 
with the UN Charter, there have also been several successful attempts at 
establishing regional human rights regimes open for membership to the states 
within a given region and applicable only within that region. So far there have 
been three such regimes: (1) the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR); (2) the 1969 American Convention 
on Human Rights (the American Convention); and (3) the 1981 African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter). In the Asian continent it has 
not yet been possible to establish a regime of a comparable level of detail.  
Bearing in mind the above, the question arises: how can we explain the emergence 
of those regional regimes in broad enough terms that are valid for all? Each of 
them, of course, has its own idiosyncrasy based on the interaction among its 
contracting parties and their motives to participate. If, however, commonality 
exists this makes it possible to construct through comparison a generalisable 
model of analysis – a line of research that has been well defined and defended by 
 
19 These are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
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Landman (2002). After all, the resemblance that regional human rights regimes 
have with each other are hardly coincidental (Onuf and Peterson 1984:338). 
Starting from the background analytical dimension, that interest and ideology are 
simultaneously present in the foundations of any of them, the following is an 
attempt to identify an explanatory framework empirically based across the regions 
where such regimes exist. 
To start with, there is the important element of historical context generating a 
certain geopolitical interest in establishing each of the regimes. The end of the 
Second World War, dubbed the “human rights war”,20 brought home the 
realisation that codifying certain norms and monitoring their implementation is 
indispensable to the effort of avoiding its recurrence. This realisation gave the 
necessary political impetus to initiate the creation of the global human rights 
regime in the first place. Completing the dimension of historical context is the 
following sharp ideological division of political doctrine between East and West, 
which resulted in a bi-polar world of enhanced cohesion within both sides and 
prolonged confrontation among them. It split the global regime in two parts (i.e. 
the two International Covenants) and, more importantly, provoked the geopolitical 
interest of both Western Europe and the USA21 in establishing human rights 
regimes making political authoritarianism less likely.  
For similar reasons, Eastern Europe remained without a human rights regime 
while, in the post-colonial context, Africa responded to the predominantly 
individualist conception adopted by Western liberal democracies with a more 
socially oriented instrument codifying a host of collective duties and rights within 
its norms. Thus diversity, for the most part, arose out of the context within which 
the regional regimes were established. It materialised in the set of rights enshrined 
by the given instrument and, relatedly, the nature and degree of effectiveness of 
the implementation mechanism it contains. The European system of human rights 
protection personified by the ECHR, for example, restricted itself to civil and 
political rights “necessary in a democratic society”, and did not accord much 
prominence to rights contributing to an “ideal commonwealth” (Robertson 
 
20 “The last [the Second World] War was essentially the ‘human rights’ war, inflicted on peoples by 
those who espoused a monstrous racist doctrine, and waged simultaneously against man and the 
community of men, with unprecedented systematic cruelty” (René Cassin at a Press Conference on 8 
July 1947, quoted in Leben 1999: 87). 
21 Donnelly (1986:625, 637) found a reasonable explanation for the establishment of the American 
Convention in the dominant power of the USA, which employed its hegemonic status to ensure the 
regime’s creation and support its operation. 
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1982:83, van Dijk and van Hoof 1990, Vasak 1982). By contrast, the American 
Convention, drawing on the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man, incorporated a wide set of social and economic rights, owing to the 
negative effect that unemployment and social exclusion have had on Latin 
American societies (Panizza 1993, Panizza 1995:187).  
In its turn, the Charter of Banjul, establishing the regime of human rights 
protection within the Organisation of African Unity, added a rather 
comprehensive set of social duties towards the family, the nation and the state (see 
Espielli 1982, M’Baye 1982, Ndiaye 1982, Kaballo, 1995). Howard (1986:15-7) 
saw this as the outcome of the specific set of social values characteristic of the 
African continent, whereby life is communal and decision-making is consensual 
and distributive. Finally, in Asia, a human rights regime spanning all the continent 
still remains a remote eventuality (see Halliday 1995, Christie 1995, Yamane 
1982, Boutros-Ghali 1982). The Cairo Declaration of 1990 and the Bangkok 
declaration of 199322 demonstrate a certain level of agreement, but fall short of 
establishing a fully fledged regional human rights regime containing a 
comprehensive set of rights and determining an implementation mechanism.23
The above description leads to the second analytical dimension in conceptualising 
regional human rights regimes. It is derived from Dower’s (1998) idea of 
distinguishing between systems of global and regional ethics. Regional human 
rights regimes prove to be much more suitable than their global counterparts in 
grasping and adapting to regional ethics. They aptly pay attention to local 
circumstances and benefit from a regionally-tailored approach, which does 
nevertheless incorporate certain universal principles. Being “the local bearers of a 
global burden” (Vincent 1986:95), regional human rights regimes are consistent 
with the ideas of IR theorists, for whom the world of states is organised in an 
 
22 The Bangkok Declaration of April 1993 preceded the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights and 
was a regional, Asia Pacific, contribution to the Vienna Declaration along with the Tunis Declaration 
of November 1992 and the San José Declaration of January 1993 (see Boyle 1995:80-1).  
23 The implementation mechanisms of these regimes also differ substantially. ECHR (see  
Hhttp://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htmH) only incorporated individual 
complaints later in its development. The judgements of the Court in Strasbourg, however, have had an 
enormous effect on domestic legislation regarding the protection of human rights. Within the 
American Convention (see Hhttp://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic3.htmH) states were obliged to 
accept individual complaints.  However, its Court has been less influential. Finally, the African Charter 
(see  Hhttp://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr.htmlH) resorts to the well-established but much less 
effective mechanism of periodical state reporting and monitoring compliance. The Cairo Declaration is 
available at Hhttp://www.humanrights.harvard.edu/documents/regionaldocs/cairo_dec.htmH and the 
Bangkok Declaration at Hhttp://www.thinkcentre.org/article.cfm?ArticleID=830H
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international society exhibiting various layers of cohesion and commonality 
embedded in each other (Bull 1977, Buzan 2004). Regional instruments bring the 
analysis one level down, which opens the space for a more detailed codification in 
terms of human rights of the system of regionally specific ethics of interaction 
between states, and between states and the individuals under their jurisdiction. 
Thirdly, and related to their embeddedness within a stronger social environment, 
regional human rights regimes emerge as counterweight to the realisation that 
ratification of global instruments may not be even a crude guide to the actual 
commitment to human rights protection in the contemporary world (Vincent 
1986:99, Falk 1981:33). Indeed, as Landman (2001) and Keith (1999) 
demonstrated empirically, the bigger number of states signing up to global human 
rights regimes does not necessarily imply an improvement in the standard of 
protection. Regional regimes are thus a way to withdraw the possibility for states 
to reap the legitimacy of being party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, for example, without bearing the costs of compliance.24 They are 
an expressed manifestation of the interest on the part of their contracting parties in 
mutually binding each other to a certain mode of political behaviour, thus 
extracting a stronger commitment to implementation than the global regimes. This 
idea relates positively with Moravcsik’s (2000) republican liberalism thesis 
explaining the creation of the ECHR.25
Finally, regional regimes appear to be the best operationalisation of the division 
between jus commune and jus proprium in human rights norms. Leben (1999) 
conceptualised it as the fundamental distinction in human rights protection that is 
observed at each level of analysis. At the regional level, it separates the individual 
understanding of human rights protection by each state (jus proprium) from the 
dispositions shared across the region (jus commune). The bigger the latter, the 
more ground for creating an effective regional human rights regime. The division 
can be seen as mirroring internationally, at a higher level of analysis, the 
reconciliation of individual moralities held by autonomous persons within 
bounded political communities (Ingram 2002:217-8) and relates the creation of 
regional regimes to the political theory of reconciling conflicting claims to rights.  
 
24 This statement must be qualified as, no doubt, some regional regimes are more effective than others. 
Among its counterparts, the most far-reaching are the effects produced by the ECHR, which remains 
the “jewel in the crown” in human rights protection (Lalumiére 1993:xv). 
25 Moravcsik (2000:225-8) claimed that the self-interest on the part of its contracting parties to “lock 
in” democratic rule domestically and abroad through the enforcement of human rights, was essential in 
the creation of the ECHR. 
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In view of the above, it is important to analyse regional regimes as initially 
originating from the human rights jus commune within the region and 
subsequently sustaining and developing it. Such regimes are never constructed on 
tabula rasa (Dower, 1998). They draw norms from both one level up - the global 
human rights regimes, and one level down - the national constitutions and legal 
systems of their contracting parties. The case of the ECHR is particularly relevant 
here. Its norms combined much of what was already codified by the ICCPR with 
the common traditions of the participating states. In the words of one of its 
creators: 
…[t]he nations of western Europe [were] co-heirs to an inheritance, a 
common heritage [in need of] protection. It was only necessary to make 
a comparison of the provisions in the constitutions, declarations of 
rights, statutes and customary laws […] with reference to human rights 
[in order to extract] the points of resemblance (Teitgen 1993:3). 
The just commune on which the Convention could be based was thus particularly 
large. Relatedly, the operation of the Convention itself and the case-law of its 
Court time and again reinforced and re-interpreted this jus commune by requiring 
“guilty” governments to amend legislation, grant human rights remedies or pay 
monetary damage to claimants (Carter and Trimble 1995: 309). 
These four analytical dimensions, historical context, regional ethics, commitment 
to implementation and jus commune, form a coherent conceptual framework for 
the understanding of regional human rights regimes. It is embedded in both the 
wider regime theory and the resulting two contrasting approaches to explaining 
state motives for signing up to human rights instruments. As much as these 
dimensions are relevant in the analysis of the regional human rights regimes 
placed at the level immediately below the global, it is not self-evident whether 
they can be successfully utilised at an even lower level of analysis. The case of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is particularly relevant in this regard as it 
represents an effort of sub-regional norm codification. Is the so constructed 
analytical framework adequate for its analysis or does the Charter present it with 
irreconcilable conceptual tensions? An answer to this question is the objective of 
the remainder of the article. 
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ANALYTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  
If the subject-matter of human rights presents regime theory with interesting 
horizons, so does the European experience among its counterparts. It stands out as 
the environment where norms and principles have found their strongest support 
and have generated a considerable compliance pull beyond what other regional 
human rights regimes have managed to secure within their geographical remits. 
Yet it seems to be on the verge of splitting, following the creation of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The latter represents an ontologically separate 
level of analysis in representing a human rights regime within an already existing 
regional regime, the ECHR. The Charter is influenced by, and borrows from the 
Convention in many respects. But does it also create another epistemological level 
of analysis by introducing analytical dimensions additional to those already 
established above? In other words, can the creation of the Charter be explained 
through reference to historical context, regional ethics, stronger commitment to 
implementation and jus commune, or does it make those irrelevant and require the 
introduction of additional analytical concepts? 
Before engaging with these questions, a few words on the Charter are in order. 
The idea for its creation acquired the first joint high-level public acknowledgment 
at the European Council of Cologne in June 1999 during the German Presidency 
of the European Union.26 The member-state executives agreed to give a mandate 
to a special body, whose composition was to be decided by the end of the same 
year, to start working on the text. After several months of discussing which 
institutions should be represented in the drafting convention and how, the 1999 
Tampere European Council defined its representation to include national 
governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament and the Commission, 
with representatives of the European Court of Justice involved as observers. Work 
commenced soon after that and at the Nice Summit at the end of 2000, the 
European Parliament, the Commission and the Council solemnly proclaimed its 
outcome: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union consisting of 
 
26 “Presidency conclusions of the Cologne European Council”, 3-4 June 1999, European Council 
Decision on the drawing up of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, available at 
Hhttp://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/june99_en.htmH. 
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seven sections and fifty four articles and containing no implementation 
mechanism.27  
In comparison to the three regional human rights regimes considered in the first 
part of the article, the Charter stands out as a qualitatively new type. It not only 
binds the EU member states, but also the Union’s common institutions. This has 
not been the case with the Council of Europe, the Organization of American 
States or the Organization of African Unity. In addition, its ratification by the 
contacting parties is not independent but forms an integral part of the process of 
ratifying the so-called Constitutional Treaty of the Union finalised in June 2003. 
As things stand now, a cursory reference to the Charter is included in the main 
body of the latter, while the full text is attached as its second part. The articles of 
the Charter envisage no implementation mechanism and contain no provisions 
creating a special organ charged with monitoring its application, which 
distinguishes it as well from the other three regional human rights regimes.  
The Charter does indeed seem to be incomparable to them in many respects. 
However, since it involves the authorities of sovereign states in a regulatory 
framework of behaviour in relation to the people under their jurisdiction, it makes 
sense to treat it on a par with other human rights regimes. It is a peculiar 
document in a particular context and in its preparation involved many different 
institutional actors including members of the European Parliament, members of 
national member-state parliaments, representatives of member-state governments 
and representatives of the European Commission. This distinguishes it from 
classic human rights instruments, both regional and global, which are usually 
drafted by governmental representatives and submitted for subsequent 
parliamentary approval and ratification. In addition, the Charter was prepared 
within a peculiar framework among other international organizations – the EU is 
not a state, nevertheless possesses far-reaching authority within its field of 
competence. These are the arguments against qualifying the Charter as a regional 
human rights regime. 
On the other hand, the charter looks very similar to an international human rights 
instrument. It repeats normal standards contained in a number of existing and 
 
27 Three years later the text of the Charter, which formed Part Two of the Draft Constitutional Treaty 
of the European Union presented by D’Estaing to the Heads of State at Thessaloniki on 20th June 2003, 
contained some amendments in Section VII – General Provisions. A modest implementation 
mechanism has been established by the European Parliament through the appointment of a network of 
experts (the Human Rights League) with recognised authority in human rights matters with the task to 
assess the implementation of each of the rights listed in the Charter (see De Schutter 2003:4). 
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operative international documents that have guided state behaviour, including the 
behaviour of EU member states for decades now. And most importantly, it limits 
state power with regard to the people under their authority. The potential 
argument that since the EU is not a state, it is not strictly state power that the 
Charter limits, holds little ground. The fact that the EU, through its institutions, 
possesses any powers at all is only attributable to a location of primary 
sovereignty, i.e. that of its member states. The power it yields can thus only be 
satisfactorily conceptualised as an extension of state power. The EU has it no 
more than by the exclusive consent of its members. And since none of the human 
rights regimes binding these states contains self-executing norms that apply for 
every authority to which they extend their power, there is a need for a special 
regime when the latter escapes the remit of the former. In these circumstances, the 
Charter is needed to remedy this discrepancy by a subsequent regulation of the 
pooled authority of the Union resulting from the gradual transferral of state 
power. 
Most broadly, there are four points justifying the qualification of the Charter as a 
regional human rights regime and not just an EU specific code of rights. Firstly, it 
contains articles that are hardly relevant for the EU, such as the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.28 The reason for including such a 
provision is not due to the risk of the European Commission becoming an agent of 
torture, but more likely due to the wish to demonstrate the belonging of the 
Charter to the family of human rights regimes. Secondly, and as already discussed 
above, the Charter is clearly a measure against an institution yielding power over 
the people in its authority. Thirdly, the Charter visually looks like an international 
human rights instrument of the type of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948 or the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The latter two were not officially 
ratified or even signed, but proclaimed just as the Charter was at Nice in 
December 2000. Nevertheless, their belonging to the family of human rights 
regimes is uncontested. Finally, the discourse during the Convention drafting the 
Charter is well indicative of its nature as a human rights regime as it emphasised 
the universal dimension of fundamental rights and underlined commonalities 
rather than distinctions. The main points of reference in the drafting process were 
global norms and rules, agreed upon and accepted by organisations beyond the 
national or EU level, and even beyond the Council of Europe (see Lerch, 2003:6). 
 
28 Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
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Considering the most fundamental dimension of analysis, that of the combination 
between ideology and interests in state motives behind signing up to it, the 
Charter makes the first step of fitting positively into the conceptual model. The 
calculation of its contracting parties indeed exhibits both the politics of interest 
and the power of ideas in prompting them to consent to its creation. It is beyond 
the scope of this study to analyse the composition of motives for every EU 
member state. Instead the case of Germany, the main proponent of the idea of the 
Charter, is taken up below. 
In terms of nation-state identity, following the catastrophe of the Second World 
War, Germany underwent a process of its thorough and profound reconstruction 
and based it on the three pillars of Christianity, democracy and social market 
economy. European integration proved to be the most potent anchor for it and, as 
a result, Germany had been the staunchest supporter of various policies within the 
European Union, including EU-specific human rights codification. In the current 
government, it was the ideological conviction of the Green Party on the normative 
inappropriateness of continuing the process of economic integration without an 
explicit and specific human rights regime for the Union, that played a central role 
in the creation of the Charter.  
The idea was laid down in the coalition agreement, with which the party entered 
government (Eicke 2000), figured in its Chapter IX Sicherheit für alle – 
Bürgerrrechte stärken under the heading “EU Initiatives” and its promotion was 
taken very seriously by the Party chief and Germany’s Foreign Minister, Joschka 
Fischer (Tarschys 2003:170). Consequently, upon commencement of its Union 
Presidency in January 1999, the German government included in its programme 
Europe’s Path into the 21st Century a commitment that EU policies must 
demonstrably protect human rights so that European decisions are meaningful to 
its people (Miller 2000).  
Besides the power of ideas, however, the promotion of the Charter was also 
dictated by the political interest of preserving the compatibility of the legal orders 
of the Union and Germany. The German Constitutional Court is legally required 
to ensure the screening of legislation operative within the country’s boundaries for 
conformity with the national constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights 
(grundrechte). In at least a couple of cases in the 1990’s it held that as long as an 
adequate standard of fundamental rights protection was not offered under EU law, 
it would not regard itself precluded from scrutinising Union measures for 
conformity with German fundamental rights, and where necessary, from 
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invalidating or disapplying such measures within Germany (Shaw 2000:345). 
Supporting the idea of the Charter has thus been a continuous interest of the 
German political establishment.  
In terms of historical context, the end of the Cold War in Europe in the late 1980’s 
presented the Union with a challenge of self-reflection, with an effect that was 
similar to the one that the end of Second World War had on the creation of global 
and regional human rights regimes. There were two main mechanisms through 
which it worked. Firstly, the Union faced an unprecedented number of 
membership applications, which made its upcoming enlargement  incomparable to 
any previous ones (Hafner 1999:783). There had been human rights conditionality 
before,29 but not in same explicit format as the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for 
membership.30 One of the important reasons for this is the fact that most of the 
applicant states have post-communist, newly democratised political systems with 
little tradition and experience in human rights protection, and this logically 
generates  “nervousness about how authority [will be] exercised within an Union 
[that includes states] with weak and short liberal democratic traditions” (Duff 
2000). 
Secondly, and related to the above idea that the Charter is provoked by the 
historical context of opening up the Union to newly democratised states, is the 
fact that in the 1990’s the ECHR as a regional human rights regime stretched far 
beyond its original design and, as a result, diminished its capability of ensuring 
the desired commitment to implementation. By 1999 the ECHR was ratified by 
more than forty-one states, almost half of which only recently emerged from the 
human-rights unfriendly grips of communism. In such circumstances, the Union is 
justified in fearing that the human rights regime that has served its development 
for more than four decades (De Schuter 2003) is perhaps becoming overstrained 
and less effective in monitoring compliance. In this respect it is relevant to note 
that among the sources of the Charter’s provisions, the ECHR stands out as the 
 
29 Most relevant are the examples of Greece, Portugal and Spain, which were newly democratised in 
the 1970’s when they applied for Union membership. For a comparative analysis of the role of the EU 
in their democratisation see Bojkov (2000). 
30 The Copenhagen membership criteria require that the candidate country must have achieved: (1) 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities; (2) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; (3) the ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union. 
See Hhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htmH. 
 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 68  
                                                
most oft-used one, which transpires as well in the explanatory memorandum 
commissioned by the Presidium31 demonstrating which rights in the Charter are 
equivalent to those contained in the ECHR.  
The latter explanation links two of the analytical dimensions discussed in the 
previous part, historical context and commitment to implementation, in addressing 
the Charter. At the sub-regional level of analysis represented by the European 
Union, they prove to be relevant conceptualisations for its newly established 
human rights regime. It can be reasonably claimed that the dimensions of regional 
ethics and jus commune are also pertinent analytical tools. Regional ethics would 
conceptualise the Charter as marking the Union’s transition from the ethics of 
economic integration that at times contravenes human rights considerations32 to 
the ethics of reaching its finalité (Menéndez 2003) as a fully-fledged human rights 
organisation (Von Bogdany 2000). Jus commune would in turn stress the Cologne 
mandate stating that “the European Council believes that this Charter should 
contain the fundamental rights and freedoms […] derived from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States”.33 Evidently, the Charter benefits from a 
wide jus commune stemming from the liberal democratic constitutions of the EU 
members. 
But this is not all. There are two additional analytical dimensions that were not 
discussed earlier, since they are irrelevant for the creation of the three regional 
human rights regimes, but are extremely relevant in the analysis of the Charter. 
They stem from the characteristics of the European Union as a unit of analysis 
that has gone far beyond the classic international regime or organisation (Peters 
1999:133) and has acquired a number of sui generis systemic properties justifying 
treating it as an instance of nothing other than itself (Rosamond 2000:15). The 
latter point has led some authors in their effort to analyse the EU with the help of 
comparative politics (Hix 1994) and to define it as a political system closely 
resembling the domestic political organisation of nation states (Hix 1999). It is in 
this respect that the dimensions of legitimacy and constitutionalism need to be 
added in analysing the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 
31 Convention document CHARTE 4473/00. 
32 Maclaren (2000) held that often the choices of national governments in protecting their citizens’ 
economic and social rights are constrained for the sake of implementing measures promoting the 
global competitiveness and functioning of the common market of the Union. 
33 “Presidency Conclusion of the Cologne European Council”, 3-4 June 1999, European Council 
Decision on the drawing up of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, available at 
Hhttp://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/june99_en.htmH
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Legitimacy is related to the fact that the Charter fulfils the function of legitimating 
the integration project in which member-state governments have involved their 
countries, and which is recognised as increasingly alienating the ordinary citizen. 
Schönalu (2001), for example, saw the process of creating the Charter within the 
drafting Convention as a revealing debate over the fundamental values keeping 
the Union together and giving it legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. It is 
uncontested that the Charter deepens the human rights legitimacy of the Union 
beyond what the ECHR is able to provide in terms of making sure that its 
contracting parties respect the norms they have signed up to in all their activities. 
The latter has become largely ineffective in controlling the Union due to the 
gradual “clever sleight of hand” (De Schutter 2003:5) by which EU member states 
transferred powers to the common institutions without making sure that they are 
bound in the same way as by the ECHR. 
Both texts related to the Charter contain direct reference to legitimacy and 
improved visibility of fundamental rights within the Union. The Cologne 
Conclusions held that the “protection of fundamental rights is a founding principle 
of the Union and an indispensable prerequisite for her legitimacy”. It also noted 
that “there appears to be a need […] to establish a Charter of fundamental rights 
in order to make their overriding importance and relevance more visible to the 
Union's citizens”.34 Reaffirming those statements, the draft presented at the Nice 
summit  saw the Union as contributing to the preservation and development of 
common values, to which end “it is necessary to strengthen the protection of 
fundamental rights […] by making [them] more visible in a Charter”.35 Such 
references point undoubtedly to the motivation shared by all EU member states to 
create the regime of the Charter in order to enhance the legitimacy of the 
integration project that they are part of. 
The dimension of constitutionalism is supported by Castiglione’s (2002) idea to 
see reasons of constitutional procedure behind creating the Charter. The 
Convention drafting was later repeated at a higher level in the Convention on the 
Future of Europe charged with preparing the Union’s Constitution. It preserved 
similar mechanism of work and was composed of a similar ratio of representatives 
of national governments, parliaments and Union institutions. The Charter itself 
found its place in the outcome of the work of the second Convention, which alone 
provides a perfect justification for why it was created in the first place. This also 
 
34 Ibid. 
35 Charter Preamble - Hhttp://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text_en.pdfH
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proves to be a reasonable explanation for why the Charter does not contain any 
implementation mechanism, since Constitutional Bills of Rights usually do not. 
Relatedly, the greatly increased powers of governance of Union institutions in 
comparison to the first decades of its existence necessarily invites a more vigorous 
re-consideration of its objectives and guiding principles.36 Rearranging the treaties 
has been an issue of long standing in EU politics, and in the absence of treaty-
enshrined protection of fundamental rights, it was the European Court of Justice 
that laid the initial foundations vindicating their respect and within its efforts of 
constitutionalising the Union declared them as “general principles” of Union law 
(Weiler 1999:107). Such status, however, has been seen as unsatisfactory since, in 
the potential clash between community objectives enjoying firm legal basis in the 
treaties and human rights defended merely as “general principles”, the former will 
naturally enjoy priority (Meehan 2000). It is precisely this inconsistency that the 
Charter, being part of a wider constitutional process, addresses. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
If the subject-matter of human rights presents regime theory with interesting 
horizons, so does the European experience among its regional counterparts. It 
stands out as the environment where norms and principles have found their 
strongest support and have generated a considerable compliance pull. Two 
explanations are advanced in addressing this outcome. Europe is the historical 
source of the idea of human rights (Leben 1999) and it played a prominent part in 
“the ruthless and wholesale destruction of individuals and groups” and in “the 
extreme deterioration” of relations between states and their people (Szabo 
1982:21). The ECHR is currently being supplemented with another regime that 
has the potential to further and strengthen the protection of human rights in 
Europe in the years to come. 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights lends itself to analysis based on the broad 
conceptual framework constructed with reference to the European, American and 
African human rights regimes. It is defined by historical context, is a reflection of 
particular regional ethics, and promotes a strong commitment to implementation. 
It steps on the wide jus commune of human rights norms available across the 
 
36 The Charter can thus be seen as addressing the greatly increased powers of governance acquired by 
EU institutions and the emerging possibility that, as these powers are exercised, human rights within 
the Union will inevitably be affected (Goldsmith 2000). 
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liberal democratic member states of the European Union. However, the Charter 
also introduces two additional analytical dimensions: legitimacy and 
constitutionalism. They appear irrelevant in the analysis of the other three regional 
regimes, since none of them were aimed at legitimising or constitutionalising the 
organisation that provided the framework for their establishment, but are 
indispensable in conceptualising the Charter itself. 
The need for broadening the analytical perspective arises out of the specificity of 
the Charter and the specificity of the political domain within which it emerged – 
the European Union. On the one hand, the Union certainly presents regime theory 
with a substantial empirical strain. It cannot be simply analysed as a group of 
rational states for whom cooperation and its regulation is defined without any 
reference to norms and principled ideas. On the other hand, the Charter itself 
bears a multiple identity representing an interesting combination of two poles: a 
constitutional bill of rights with partial resemblance to domestic human rights 
guarantees in liberal democracies, and a veritable regional human rights regime of 
the type that helped articulate the analytical dimensions of historical context, 
regional ethics, commitment to implementation and jus commune. 
The Charter proves to represent a separate level of the analysis both ontologically 
and epistemologically. It goes one step further than the three regional human 
rights regimes in its relation to both the organisation within which it emerged and 
the member states forming it. Ontologically, it is a qualitatively different human 
rights regime which in its specificity comes close to a constitutional bill of rights. 
Epistemologically, it widens the framework of analysing such regimes by 
introducing two new elements indispensable for its conceptualisation. 
 
 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 72  
REFERENCES 
 
Beetham, David (1995) “What Nature for Economic and Social Rights?” in David Beetham 
(ed.) Politics and Human Rights. 21-49. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Beitz, Chalres (2003) “What Human Rights Mean”, Dædalus 132(1). 36-46. 
Bentham, Jeremy (1987) “Anarchical Fallacies” in Jeremy Waldron (ed.) Nonsense upon 
Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man, 43-56. London: Methuen. 
Bojkov, Victor D. (2001) The European Union and Democratisation in Small European 
States. Venezia: Marsilio Editori, EMA Awarded Theses Collection, Vol. 3. 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1982) “The League of Arab States” in Karel Vasak (ed.) The 
International Dimensions of Human Rights, 3-10. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Boyle, Kevin (1995) “Stock-Taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human 
Rights, Vienna 1993” in David Beetham (ed.) Politics and Human Rights, 79-95. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson (1984) “Introduction” in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds) 
The Expansion of International Society, 1-9. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burke, Edmund (1790) Reflections on the Revolution in France. New York: P.F. Collier & Son 
(edited by C. Eliot, the Harvard Classics Series, Vol. 24, Part 3). 
Burton, John (1972) World Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buzan, Barry (1993) “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism 
ad Regime Theory Meet the English School”, International Organization 47(3): 327-352. 
Buzan, Barry (1995) “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered” 
in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds) International Relations Theory Today, 23-49. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Buzan, Barry (2004, forthcoming) International Society and World Society: English School 
Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Carter, Barry E. and Phillip R. Trimble (1995) International Law. Boston: Little Brown. 
IJIS Volume 2
V. BOJKOV – INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 73  
Castiglione, Dario (2002) “From the Charter to the Constitution of Europe? Notes on the 
Constitutionalisation Process in the EU”, Queens Paper on Europeanisation 5/2002, Queens 
University of Belfast available from:< http://www.qub.ac.uk/ies/onlinepapers/poe5-02.pdf> 
Christie, Kenneth (1995) “Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast Asia” In David 
Beetham (ed.) Politics and Human Rights, 204-218. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Cranston, Maurice (1964) What are Human Rights? New York: Basic Books.  
Cranston, Maurice (1967) “Human Rights, Real and Supposed” in David D. Raphael (ed.) 
Political Theory and the Rights of Man, 112-148. London: Macmillan. 
De Schutter, Olivier (2003) “The Questions to be Decided: Protecting Fundamental Rights - an 
Issue in the Convention on the Future of Europe” Expert commentary available from: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/charte/en/questions.html> 
Donnelly, Jack (1986) “International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis”, International 
Organization 40(3): 599-642. 
Dower, Nigel (1998) “Human Rights, Global Ethics and Globalisation” in Roland Axtmann 
(ed.) Globalisation and Europe: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, 201-232. London: 
Pinder. 
Duff, Andrew (2000) “Towards a European Federal Society” in Kim Feus (ed.) The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: Text and Commentaries, 67-89. London: Kogan Page. 
Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth. 
Eicke, Tim (2000) “The European Charter of Fundamental Rights – Unique Opportunity or 
Unwelcome Distraction”, European Human Rights Law Review 3(2): 280-296. 
Espiell, Héctor G. (1982) “The Organization of African States (OAS)” in Karel Vasak (ed.) 
The International Dimensions of Human Rights, 543-574. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Evans, Tim (2001) The Politics of Human Rights: A Global Perspective. London: Pluto Press. 
Falk, Richard (1981) Human Rights and State Sovereignty. New York: Holmes and Meier. 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) “International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change”. International Orgnaization 52(4): 887-917. 
Finnis, John (1980) Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 74  
Goldsmith, Peter, QC (2000) “Consolidation of Fundamental Rights at EU Level: The British 
Perspective” in Kim Feus (ed.) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Text and 
Commentaries, 45-53. London: Kogan Page. 
Habermas, Jürgen (2001) The Post National Constellation: Political Essays. London: Polity 
Press (translated, edited and introduced by Max Pensky).  
Hafner, Danica F. (1999) “Dilemmas in Managing the Expanding EU: the EU and Applicant 
States’ Points of View”, Journal of European Public Policy 6(5): 783-801. 
Halliday, Fred (1995) “Relativism and Universalism in Human Rights: The Case of the Islamic 
Middle East” in David Beetham (ed.) Politics and Human Rights, 152-167. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger (1997) Theories of International 
Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (1979) The Political Economy of Human Rights. 
Boston: South End Press. 
Hix, Simon (1994) “The Study of the European Community: the Challenge to Comparative 
Politics”, West European Politics 17(1), 1-30. 
Hix, Simon (1999) The Political System of the European Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Howard, Rhoda (1986) “Is there an African Concept of Human Rights” in John R. Vincent 
(ed.) Foreign Policy and Human Rights, 11-32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hurrell, Andrew J. (1995) “International Society and Regimes: A Reflective Approach” in 
Volker Rittberger (ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations, 49-72. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Ignatieff, Michael (2001) Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). 
Ingram, Attracta (2002) A Political Theory of Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Jones, Peter (1994) Rights: Issues in Political Theory. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Kaballo, Sidgi (1995) “Human Rights and Democratization in Africa” in David Beetham (ed.) 
Politics and Human Rights, 189-203. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Keith, Linda C. (1999) “The United Nations International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behaviour?”, Journal of Peace Research 
36(1), 95-118. 
IJIS Volume 2
V. BOJKOV – INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 75  
Keohane, Robert O., ed. (1989a) International Institutions and State Power: Essays in 
International Relations Theory. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Keohane, Robert O. (1989b) “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics” in 
Keohane, Robert O. (ed.) International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International 
Relations Theory, 78-102. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition. Boston: Little Brown. 
Krasner, Stephen D., ed. (1983a) International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1983b) “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables” in Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.) International Regimes, 56-82. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1995) “Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights” in Volker Rittberger 
(ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations, 139-167. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (1984) “Thrasymmachos Revisited: On the Relevance of Norms and the 
Study of Law for International Relations”, Journal of International Affairs 37(2), 343-361 
Lalumiére, Catherine (1993) “Human Rights in Europe: Challenges for the Next Millennium” 
In R. St. J. Macdonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds) The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights. xii-xvi. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.  
Landman, Todd (2001) Measuring the Human Rights Regime. (Paper presented at the 97th 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Fall 2001.) 
Landman, Todd (2002) “Comparative Politics and Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 
24(4): 890-923. 
Leben, Charles (1999) “Is there a European Approach to Human Rights?” in Philip Alston 
(ed.) The EU and Human Rights, 69-98. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lerch, Marika (2003) “European Identity in International Society: A Constructivist Analysis of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”. Constitutionalism Web Papers, ConWEB No. 2/2003, 
available from: < http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb/> 
Locke, John (1990) Questions Concerning the Law of Nature. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
edited and introduced by R. Horowitz, J. Clay and D. Clay. 
Marx, Karl (1987) “On the Jewish Question” in Jeremy Waldron (ed.) Nonsense upon Stilts: 
Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man, 34-52. London: Methuen. 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 76  
M’Baye, Kéba (1982) “Human Rights in Africa” in Karel Vasak (ed.) The International 
Dimensions of Human Rights, 583-600. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Maclaren, David (2000) “Economic Rights in Contemporary Europe” on Linda Hancock and 
Chris O’Brien (eds) Rewriting Rights in Europe, 76-92. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Meehan, Michael (2000) “(Un)charted Waters: the Legal Background to Fundamental Rights 
Protection in the EU” in Kim Feus (ed.) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Text and 
Commentaries, 81-112. London: Kogan Page. 
Menéndez, Agustín J. (2003) “Finalité through Rights” in Erik Eriksen, John Fossum and 
Agustín Menéndez (eds) The Chartering of Europe: The European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and its Constitutional Implications, 34-51. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Miller, Bruce (1979) “Morality, Interests and Rationalization” on Ralph Pettman (ed.) Moral 
Claims in World Affairs, 31-59. London: Croom Helm. 
Miller, Vaughne (2000) Human Rights in the EU: the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
(Research Paper 00/32, 20 March 2000, House of Commons Library.) 
Milner, Helen V. (1997) Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Policies and 
International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (2000) The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe. International Organization 54(2), 217-52.  
Moul, William B. (1973) “The Levels of Analysis Problem Revisited”, Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 61(1), 494-513. 
Ndiaye, Birame (1982) “The Place of Human Rights in the Charter of the Organization of 
African Unity” in Karel Vasak (ed.) The International Dimensions of Human Rights, 601-615. 
Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Onuf, Nicholas G. and V. Spike Peterson (1984) “Human Rights from an International 
Regimes Perspective”, Journal of International Affairs 37(2), 329-342 
Panizza, Francisco (1993) “Human Rights: Global Culture and Social Fragmentation”, Bulletin 
of Latin American Research 12(4), 198-227. 
Panizza, Francisco (1995) “Human Rights in the Processes of Transition and Consolidation of 
Democracy in Latin America” on David Beetham (ed.) Politics and Human Rights, 168-188. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Peters, Guy B. (1999) Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’. 
London: Pinter. 
IJIS Volume 2
V. BOJKOV – INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 77  
Puchala, Donald J. and R. F. Hopkins (1983) “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive 
Analysis” in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes, 25-42. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Risse, Thomas and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) “The Socialization of International Human Rights 
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction” in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Popp and Kathryn 
Sikkink (eds) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, 1-38. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rittberger, Volker, ed. (1995) Regime Theory and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Robertson, Arthur H. (1982) Human Rights in the World. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Rosamond, Ben (2000) Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Sartori, Giovanni (1965) Democratic Theory. New York: Praeger. 
Schönalu, Justus (2001) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Legitimation through 
Deliberation. PhD Dissertation, University of Reading. 
Shaw, Jo (2000) Law of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Sikkink, Kathryn (1993) “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United 
States and Western Europe” in Judih Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds) Ideas and 
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, 43-59. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Szabo, Imre (1982) “Historical Foundations of Human Rights and Subsequent Developments” 
in Karel Vasak (ed.) The International Dimensions of Human Rights, 11-40. Westport: 
Greenwood Press. 
Tarschys, Daniel (2003) “Goal Congestion: Multi-Purpose Governance in the European 
Union” in Erik O. Eriksen, John E. Fossum and Agustín J. Menéndez (eds) The Chartering of 
Europe: The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Constitutional Implications, 
161-178. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Teitgen, Pierre-Henri (1993) “Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights” in 
R. St. J. Macdonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds) The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights. 3-14. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.  
Van Dijk, P. and van Hoof, G. J. H. (1990) Theory and Practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers. 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 78  
Vasak, Karel (1982) “The Council of Europe” in Karel Vasak (ed.) The International 
Dimensions of Human Rights, 457-542. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Vincent, John R. (1986) Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Von Bogdany, Armin (2000) “The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human 
Rights and the Core of the European Union” Common Market Law Review 37(6): 1307-1338. 
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1999) The Constitution of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Wieruszewski, Roman (1994) “Some Comments Concerning the Concept of Economic and 
Social Rights” in Karl Drzewicki (ed.) Social Rights as Human Rights: A European Challenge. 
Åbo Academy University: Institute for Human Rights. 
Yamane, Hiroko (1982) “Asia and Human Rights” in Karel Vasak (ed.) The International 
Dimensions of Human Rights, 651-670. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Young, Oran (1994) International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless 
Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
IJIS Volume 2
HYDROPOLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA: 
TOWARDS A REGIONAL WATER REGIME? 
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Abstract 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in Central Asia five new 
independent states –Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan – found themselves in a highly globalised international system and a 
liberalized economic order. One of the reflections of the drastic changes in the 
dynamics of the region is the growing tension over the waters of Amu Darya and 
Syr Darya rivers.  Since 1991, transboundary water management has become one 
of the most complex security problems among newly independent Central Asian 
states. This article analyses the efforts to form a regional water regime in the 
region, within the context of a regional security complex explanation, and 
explores the role of internal and external dynamics on regional cooperation over 
water resources.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in Central Asia, five new 
independent states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan – found themselves in a highly globalised international system and a 
liberalized economic order. Their present borders and infrastructure designed by 
the Soviet Union were based on the idea of an unbreakable union of republics. As 
a result, integration of these newly independent republics into a globalised 
international system and liberalized economic order was a real challenge. Besides 
the systemic challenge, Central Asian governments have had difficulties dealing 
with internal problems, such as stagnating economies, high levels of corruption 
and environmental degradation, each as a result of their loss of traditional revenue 
from Moscow (Weinthal 2000). 
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After 1991, Russia’s preoccupation with its internal economic and political crisis 
led to an involuntary disengagement from Central Asia. Thus, it has made it easier 
for the Central Asian governments to pursue their own foreign policies and 
national security agendas. Growing engagement of other regional powers - 
Turkey, Iran, China - into Central Asia as well as the global powers - the US and 
the EU - is a consequence of the Russian disengagement from the region (Jonson 
& Allison 2001). 
 
Central Asia’s location at the crossroads of Eurasia and its rich oil and gas 
reserves have attracted external actors’ attention. Since its war against terrorism, 
the US has been actively involved in the region in terms of economic and military 
aid. But the claim that the active engagement of external powers in the region 
would pave the way for the Central Asian states to overcome economic and 
political problems and resolve conflicts has not yet been confirmed. Rather, the 
engagement of external actors’ has caused intensification in the division among 
regional actors (Jonson & Allison 2001). 
 
One of the reflections of the drastic changes in internal and external dynamics of 
the region is the growing tension over the waters of Amu Darya and Syr Darya 
rivers (see figure 1: Map of Aral Sea Basin) The misallocation of waters from 
these rivers has been one of the key issues contributing to the tension among 
riparian states. Disputes have developed between the downstream countries, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which are heavy consumers of water 
for agriculture, and the upstream countries, Kyrgyztan and Tajikistan. Whereas 
large scale water is required by the downstream states in order to support their 
growing agricultural sector, upstream countries also need more water for 
electricity generation and farming (ICG Asia Report 2002). 
 
Given its economic value, water problems can be considered as a security threat 
for the Aral Sea basin republics, especially for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. As 
a result of the dissolution of the integrated Soviet economic system, water based 
economic structures have weakened and paved the way for the promotion of 
national economic interests and mutually incompatible demands for water 
(Horsman 2001). On the other hand, disputes over water allocation and 
desiccation of the Aral Sea have offered a soft issue for external actors, some of 
which have a more direct and negative influence on the security dynamics of the 
region. 
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FIGURE 1. THE ARAL SEA BASIN  
 
Source: Dukhovny and Sokolov (2003) 
 
The main hypothesis of this article is that hydropolitics are an indispensable part 
of the regional security complex that exists where states share the same river 
basin. Therefore, the possibility of conflict or cooperation over transboundary 
water issues should be analysed within the context of security dynamics of the 
particular region. In order to visualize this hypothesis, transboundary water 
management efforts on the Aral Sea basin among five Central Asian states will be 
examined. The efforts to develop a regional water regime will be analysed within 
the context of a regional security complex and security dynamics in Central Asia. 
In light of the analysis, the following question will be addressed: To what extent 
are external and internal security dynamics interacting in the resolution of 
disputes over river basins and in the development of a water regime? 
 81 
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In the first part of the article five Central Asian Republics will be analysed as a 
regional security complex. Here Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s regional security 
complex theory will be applied since the theory aims at empirical studies on 
specific regions. Moreover, regional security complex theory offers a systematic 
framework in the study of internal conditions, relations among units in the region, 
relations between regions, and the role of global actors. In this section, internal 
and external security dynamics of Central Asia will be explored within the 
framework of regional security complex theory.  
 
The second part of the article will focus on the hydropolitics of the Aral Sea. In 
order to analyse hydropolitics of the region and regional states’ efforts to form an 
institutionalised water regime, international regime theory will be examined. In 
light of regime theory, the disputes and cooperation efforts over the allocation of 
waters of Amu Darya and Syr Darya will be explored. 
 
CENTRAL ASIA AS A REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX  
In People, States and Fear (1991), Buzan defines security complex as “a group of 
states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their 
national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from another” (Buzan 
1991:190). Later, the definition of a regional security complex was reformulated 
by Buzan and Wæver to include the possibility of different actors besides states 
and several sectors besides the military sector.  It is redefined as “a set of units 
whose major processes of securitisation,37 desecuritisation, or both are so 
interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved 
apart from one another” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:44). The states in a particular 
regional complex must possess security interdependence sufficient enough to 
establish a set and to differentiate them from neighbouring security regions. That 
is to say, regional security complexes are defined as substructures of the 
international system by possessing a relative intensity of security interdependence 
among units and security indifference between and surrounding them (Buzan and 
Wæver 2003). 
 
 
37 According to Ole Wæver (1993) securitisation and de-securitisation are related to the questions of 
when, why and how do elites label issues and developments as security problems? When, why and 
how do they succeed and fail respectively? What attempts are made by other groups to press 
securitisation on the agenda?  
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Considering the anarchical characteristic of the international system, regional 
security complexes are defined with two types of relations: power relations and 
patterns of amity and enmity. Like the international system, regional security 
complexes could be examined in terms of power relations and they could be 
classified as unipolar, bipolar, tri-polar or multi-polar. Moreover, within a 
particular regional security complex the concept of regional balance of power 
plays a significant role (Buzan and Wæver 2003). On the other hand, external 
factors are also effective in stimulating changes in the power balance in the 
region, taking the form of alignments with particular regional units. Besides 
regional power relations, regional security complexes are mainly determined by 
patterns of amity (relationships raging from genuine friendship to expectations of 
protection and support) and enmity (relationships set by suspicion and fear) 
among regional actors (Jonson & Allison 2001). The patterns of amity and enmity 
are socially constructed within historical factors or common cultures.  
 
In order to better understand regional security dynamics, either cooperative or 
conflictual, it is inevitable to explore the interactions of internal and external 
factors. In most cases, regional security complexes are penetrated by outside 
powers. The interplay of internal and external factors determines the structure for 
interaction both at the regional and international level. As it can be observed in 
some cases like the EU, intensification of contacts and exchanges within 
particular regional security complexes promote security cooperation in the form of 
a security community (Jonson & Allison 2001).  
 
According to Buzan and Wæver, the most well-established function of regional 
security complex theory is that it offers a framework for empirical studies of 
regional security by specifying four levels of analysis: (1) domestic, in the states 
of the region; (2) state-to-state relations; (3) the region’s interaction with 
neighbouring regions; and (4) the role of global powers in the region.  These four 
levels of analysis constitute the security constellation in the specified region 
(Buzan & Wæver 2003). 
 
When it comes to the five Central Asian states, although they are defined as parts 
of a larger security complex around Russia, they could be considered a candidate 
for a separate regional security complex. Buzan and Wæver classify Central Asia 
as a sub-complex in a process of forming internal dynamics. Moreover, the 
Central Asian republics consist of a more or less consistent system based on 
geographical and cultural terms. In security terms the region has its own dynamics 
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and preoccupations, although each individual state pursues their own national 
policies, and their security policies are interconnected (Jonson & Allison 2001). 
On the other hand, there are questions raised with regards to a regional security 
complex consisting of five Central Asian republics. Are there obvious common 
grounds for security interactions among the units? Is it possible to consider a 
Central Asian security complex without Afghanistan, which plays a significant 
role in exporting instabilities across the region? Is it possible to distinguish a 
Central Asian security complex from a Caucasian security complex?   
 
Given the configuration of forces, interests and threats, Burnashev discerns three 
circles of participants in the Central Asian Security Complex: (1) the Inner Circle, 
consisting of regional states including Afghanistan; (2) the Second Circle, 
including actors with vitally important and important national interests in the 
inner circle like Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey; and (3) the Third 
Circle, encompassing actors that either have their own interests in the region or 
are capable of playing a substantial role such as the US and the EU (Burnashev 
2002). 
 
For the purpose of this article, only five Central Asian Republics will be taken 
into consideration with their ongoing process of forming a transboundary water 
regime as a part of their overall security considerations. Afghanistan and its 
possible involvement in the Central Asian water regime will not be considered as 
part of the analysis. Furthermore, the Caucasus sub-security complex will be 
separated from the Central Asian one because of the obvious geographical and 
geo-strategic differences, as well as cross cutting differences such as the 
importance and nature of religiosity and the possession or absence of oil.  
 
Central Asia consists of five fairly weak states without any leading power among 
them, despite Uzbekistan’s will to be most powerful actor in the region. Since 
their independence, dynamics of destabilization have played a major role in the 
regional states’ development. For the regional states, with each passing year, 
problems are getting deeper and deeper. The main problems common for all 
regional states are various degrees of bad governance and internal instability; low 
socio-economic standards and varying degrees of dependence on Russia; shortage 
and mismanagement of natural resources, i.e. water; and a high degree of 
vulnerability to “new threats” such as crime, smuggling, drug trafficking, terrorist 
infiltration and uncontrolled migration (Bailes 2003). Furthermore, for most of the 
Central Asian governments, Islamic extremism is the major threat for their 
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countries’ stability. As a result of these security challenges, military expenditures 
have been rising in most of the Central Asian republics. But, as illustrated in 
Figure 2 (Military Expenditures of Five Central Asian States), military 
expenditures constitute 1-2 percent of GDP for all these countries except 
Turkmenistan, whose military expenditure was 3.8 percent of GDP in 2000. This 
is an extension of Turkmenistan’s neutral position and its ambition to be self-
sufficient in terms of military security (Perlo-Freeman & Stålenheim 2003). 
 
Tajikistan is the poorest among the five republics of Central Asia. With the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan was faced with serious economic 
problems. The civil war in 1997 between Moslem opposition and the Tajik 
government has also caused damages to the infrastructure and economic structures 
of the country. As its economy is highly dependent on agriculture, the issue of 
water allocation is a vital issues for Tajikistan. However, in contrast to other 
regional states, Tajikistan has not suffered from water shortages due to its 
upstream position over both Amu Darya and Syr Darya. With regards to its 
relations with other regional republics, Tajikistan with its largely Persian 
population has a strategic inclination toward Iran and Afghanistan rather than 
toward “modern and secular” models.  This is leading to fear among other 
republics that if Tajikistan’s radical Islamic movement gains control, it will 
attempt to influence neighbouring countries (Alaolmolki 2001). 
 
Krgyztan is the most vulnerable among the Central Asian Republics, in terms of 
dealing with security threats, due to its lack of military and economic structures. 
This was evident when armed militant Islamist groups attacked Fergana Valley - a 
valley shared by Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Because of this 
vulnerability, Kyrgyztan still depends on Russia for military assistance 
(Alaolmolki 2001). With regards to the importance of water resources for 
Krgyztan, like Tajikistan, Kyrgyztan’s population heavily depends on agriculture.  
In addition, hydroelectricity is also of vital importance for the Kyrgyz economy 
(Alaolmolki 2001). 
 
 85 
 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 86
FIGURE 2. MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF THE 5 CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS38
 
All figures in US $Million, at constant 2000 prices and exchange rates and for 
calendar year 
. . = Data not available or not applicable ( ) = Uncertain figure, [ ] = estimate. 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Military expenditure in constant US dollars 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Uzbekistan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  92.8  77.7  104  [121]  ..  184  ..  137  ..  
Military expenditure as a share (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) 
  
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Uzbekistan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  1.5  1.1  1.2  [1.4]  ..  1.7  ..  1.1  
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Military expenditure in constant US dollars 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Kazakhstan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  (248)  (158)  163  177  165  188  137  143  210  [202]  
Military expenditure as a share (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) 
  
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Kazakhstan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  (1.0)  (0.9)  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.3  0.9  0.8  1.0  
 
TURKMENISTAN 
Military expenditure in constant US dollars 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Turkmenistan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  102  90.5  87.1  132  112  121  [163]  ..  ..  
Military expenditure as a share (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) 
  
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Turkmenistan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  1.8  2.3  2.0  4.0  3.1  3.4  [3.8]  ..  
                                                 
38 Source for all countries: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2004)  
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TAJIKISTAN 
Military expenditure in constant US dollars 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Tajikistan ..  ..  ..  ..  24.7  102  32.4  [9.4]  10.1  14.4  12.8  13.8  11.9  11.9  ..  
Military expenditure as a share (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) 
  
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Tajikistan ..  ..  ..  ..  0.4  3.9  1.7  [1.1]  1.3  1.7  1.3  1.4  1.2  1.2  
 
KYRGYZTAN 
Military expenditure in constant US dollars 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Kyrgyzstan ..  ..  ..  ..  11.8  9.5  8.9  16.3  15.4  18.7  17.4  20.9  24.6  [24.9]  ..  
Military expenditure as a share (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) 
  
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Kyrgyzstan ..  ..  ..  ..  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.7  1.5  1.6  1.5  1.7  1.8  [1.7]  
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2004) 
 
In Uzbekistan, Islamic extremism and the fear of “Tajikisation” of the country are 
perceived as the main security threats. Thus, this situation has forced the Uzbek 
government to make the army, which is the largest military organization in the 
region, ready and reform the armed forces. As an extension of its aggressive 
policy against extreme Islamic movements, Uzbekistan has been one of the 
enthusiastic supporters of the US-led war against transnational terrorism. The 
Uzbek government has agreed to the deployment of 1500 American troops and, in 
return, the US provided Uzbekistan USD 160 million in aid in 2002 (Rasizade 
2002). This economic assistance and security guarantees have paved the way for 
the Uzbek government’s ambitions to be the regional hegemon. Despite its 
military strength, Uzbekistan is very vulnerable in terms of maintaining its 
agricultural sector, which is the main sector of the Uzbek economy. The 
agricultural sector, based mainly on monocultures of cotton, is steadily declining 
because of the water supply problems, soil degradation and droughts. Due to its 
reliance on cotton production and its objectives for food self-sufficiency, 
Uzbekistan views irrigation as one of the key security issues.  
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country. In contrast to other regional states, Turkmenistan has stressed its neutral 
position and within this context has started a massive increase in the size of its 
armed forces (Perlo-Freemen & Stålenheim 2003). As Turkmenistan has the 
fourth largest gas reserves in the world, its economy is mainly based on the export 
of natural gas and related products (Alaolmolki 2001). In spite of its sufficient 
income from natural gas, Turkmenistan has aimed to achieve food self-
sufficiency. As a result, like Uzbekistan, the issue of water allocation is viewed as 
a part of national security by the Turkmen government.  
 
Kazakhstan, thanks to its rich endowment of natural resources, has the most 
developed economy in the region. It is the second largest oil producer among the 
former Soviet Republics, producing over five hundred thousand barrels per day. 
Because of its oil and mineral resources, Kazakhstan has the potential for 
attracting foreign investment. Its economy is virtually self-sufficient with a well-
developed agricultural sector, a productive extractive industry, and an extensive 
transportation network (Rumer 2002). In terms of social and political threats, 
unlike other Central Asian states, a militant Islamic threat has been less visible in 
Kazakhstan As with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, water resources for irrigation 
is one of the security issues for Kazakhstan.  
 
Since their independence, the Central Asian republics have tried to overcome the 
acute internal problems and external challenges. Another major problem of the 
region is the disunified character of the regional states due to the fact that each 
individual state has acted to defend its own interests and ensure its survival. This 
self-interested behaviour of the Central Asian states has led to tensions among 
them particularly in terms of conflicts over water and energy resources. As a 
result of these acute internal problems and external challenges accompanied with 
conflictual interests, the Central Asian republics remain as weak states and 
dependent on alignments with powerful external powers.   
 
The major problems inherent in the internal dynamics of the region, which are 
also interlinked with each other, are the lack of regional cooperation and the 
unsettled disputes over natural resources. As already briefly touched upon, the 
Central Asian states are sharing similar problems after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union with different paths to overcome these problems. As an extension of 
the common threats and problems, they have tried to form institutions for 
developing cooperation among them. Up until now, all of the institutional 
structural efforts were able to achieve full participation of all five republics except 
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for the case of water management institutions.  In spite of these cooperative 
regional efforts, according to Jonson and Allison, conflictual dynamics are more 
deeply embedded in the region (Jonson & Allison 2001). 
 
Apart from disputes over water allocation, security problems in the region are 
generally transnational, e.g. international terrorism (mainly Islamic terror 
activities) and illegal trafficking, not inter-state. According to Buzan and Wæver 
(2003), no pattern of amity and enmity has formed among regional states. The 
most remarkable characteristics of internal dynamics within the Central Asian 
security complex is the existence of lower level structural alignments among 
regional states. In general regional states have not formed structural alignments as 
a result of their self-interested policies. “Nobody is looking to set up a system of 
alliances between the republics of Central Asia” (Roy in Buzan and Wæver 2003). 
Thus, regional dynamics have formed at other levels. Regional states prefer to 
develop structural alignments with powerful actors from the second or third circle 
such as Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia, Uzbekistan’s pro-American attitudes, 
and Kyrgyztan’s military dependency on Russia.  Furthermore, within the regional 
context, the ongoing competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and 
Uzbekistan’s ambition to be the regional hegemon on the one hand and 
Turkmenistan’s unilateral isolationist regional policy on the other have shaped the 
power relations within the inner circle of the regional security complex. 
Competitions have influenced Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s 
alignments with regional states as well as other external actors.  
 
In the second and third circle of the regional security complex, the policies of 
Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and the US might be seen.  The relations between 
these extra regional actors and regional actors are characterized by economic 
consideration, gaining control over the region’s rich energy resources, security 
concerns, and historical and cultural backgrounds. The strategic interests of 
external powers are changing in a broad spectrum from maintaining the status quo 
to increasing their own influence in the region. Within this context, Russia, China, 
Iran, Turkey and the US are the major external powers which link their national 
interests to Central Asia.  
 
Besides its geo-strategic considerations, Russia has two reasons to be involved in 
Central Asia: (1) to protect ethnic Russians in the region; and (2) to maintain 
access to important natural resources, such as oil, natural gas and some other 
minerals, of the region (Jones 2000). However, Russia’s own internal problems 
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have not allowed a deep involvement in the region. With the exception of 
Kazakhstan, which has a long border with Russia and a fairly large Russian 
population, and Kyrgyztan, which depends on Russia in terms of military 
assistance, Russia has not actively engaged with the Central Asian republics.  
 
On the other hand, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union it was expected that 
Turkey and Iran would play crucial roles in the region. In order to fill the political 
vacuum after the collapse of the Union, both Iran and Turkey attempted to 
establish ties, mainly based on ethnicity, language, culture, religion, geography 
and economics, with particular Central Asian states. Iran has been attracted by the 
prospect of its own sphere of influence in the region. In the beginning, Iran tried 
to become a source of religious inspiration, especially for Tajikistan, but since 
then it has adopted a different policy. Besides its relations with Tajikistan, Iran 
has relations with Turkmenistan, with which it shares a long border, through 
proposals to construct new pipelines across Iran to the Persian Gulf (Rumer 
2002). However, with the exception of Turkmenistan, the other Central Asian 
republics are reluctant to have close relations with Iran due to their suspicions of 
Iranian support for the Tajik Islamic groups. Furthermore, Iran’s prospects to 
control Turkmenistan’s natural gas resources through building pipelines have 
been opposed by the US, which has significant opposition to any plans to route 
Turkmenistan’s gas through Iran and to any cooperation between Turkmenistan 
and Iran. As far as Turkey is concerned, it failed to follow its ambitions to play a 
leading role in Central Asia because of its own economic problems as well as a 
lack of enthusiasm in the region for Turkey’s leading role (Winrow 2001). 
However, thanks to its status as a member of NATO and the Western world’s 
willingness to show Turkey as a “modern and secular” model for the Central 
Asian republics, the situation turned  in favour of Turkey especially in terms of 
pipeline routes.  
 
On the other hand, because of its dominating Muslim region of Xinjiang, China 
has always supported oppressive regimes that have pursued policies against 
extremist Islam in Central Asia. It has also developed economic and trade 
relations with regional states. Furthermore, it is one of the important donors of 
military aid to Central Asia and is reported to have provided a total of USD 4.2 
million in 2002 (Perlo-Freeman and Stålenheim 2003). 
 
For the US, one of the most significant reasons to engage in the region is its 
campaign against the new threats of transnational terrorism, weapons of mass 
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destruction and “rogue states”. Since 9/11 the American military existence in the 
region has expanded. Within this context, all Central Asian republics signed 
agreements with the US for the use of their military bases and deployment of US 
troops. Even neutral Turkmenistan has granted permission for the US’ military 
overflights (Rasizade 2002). In return, the US has provided economic and military 
assistance and security guarantees for the regional states. 
 
Since 1991, Russia, China and the US have attempted to exert power on Central 
Asia. On the one hand, China, with developing economic relations with the 
Central Asian republics, has gradually increased its own sphere of influence. On 
the other hand, the US also has paid greater attention to the region as a periphery 
of its foreign policy. Especially after 9/11 the existing power structure has 
drastically changed with some of the Central Asian states’ sudden turn towards 
the US. As a consequence of American and Chinese involvement in the region, 
Russia’s role in the region has been threatened. Accompanied by the regional 
states’ attitudes in favour of the US and China, a conflictual dynamic has 
developed in terms of relations between external powers engaging in the region. 
On the one hand, the Russian Central Asia agenda has been occupied with the 
growing American influence. On the other hand, the US has tried to fetter Iranian 
involvement in the region. Furthermore, both Russia and China have competed in 
developing economic and political ties with the Central Asian states. As a 
reflection of these conflictual external dynamics and previously mentioned 
disunified internal dynamics of the region, it can be foreseen that Central Asia is 
developing into a region of strategic rivalry.  
 
The preceding section has analysed Central Asia as a regional security complex, 
examining the external and internal dynamics which determine the characteristics 
of the security. In the following section, hydropolitics as one of the major security 
issues among the regional states will be explored, and in light of the 
characteristics of the regional security complex, the possibility of a properly 
functioning water regime will be discussed. 
HYDROPOLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA: TOWARDS A REGIONAL 
WATER REGIME  
Considering the vital importance of water for human beings and societies, water 
resources are one of the particular issues that reflects a link between 
environmental degradation and the outbreak of conflicts (Horsman 2001). Thus, 
water has security implications while maintaining the core foci of security – 
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competition and violence (Horsman 2001). In most cases, water threats are 
perceived as threats to national security, as in the case of deprivation of water for 
irrigation by other riparians which may lead to economic problems, which in turn 
makes a state vulnerable to foreign pressure (Møller 2003). According to Levy 
“for any environmental threat to be a security threat, there must be some 
demonstrable connection to some vital national interests” (Levy 1995:45). As a 
result of its security implications, disputes over water and efforts to form a water 
regime will be considered as an indispensable part of the Central Asian regional 
security complex. 
 
International regimes have important effects on interdependent relations within 
the particular regional security complex. Since World War II, specific sets of rules 
have been applied as guides for international actors. International regimes are 
intermediate factors between the power structures and the bargaining that take 
place in it. Within this context, it is necessary to examine international regimes in 
order to understand their effects on the patterns of interdependence and power 
relations among units within a security complex.  
 
Regimes are defined as:  
 
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations (Krasner 1991:2).  
According to Krasner regimes are more than temporary arrangements which 
change with power and interest shifts. In this respect Keohane and Nye 
differentiate between agreements and regimes. According to them, agreements are 
“one-shot” arrangements while the purpose of regimes is to facilitate these 
arrangements (Keohane & Nye 1989). Furthermore, regime governed behaviour 
must be beyond short-term interests. In order to establish a regime, states should 
accept reciprocity and sacrifice short-term interests with the expectation that other 
actors reciprocate in the future (Krasner 1991). 
 
According to Krasner, regimes are not regarded as ends in themselves, as they 
affect related behaviour and outcomes. In the international system, mainly based 
on the idea of sovereign states, the main function of regimes is to coordinate state 
behaviour in order to achieve desired outcomes. In other words, regimes help to 
achieve desired outcomes, which cannot be achieved through uncoordinated 
individual self-interests (Krasner 1991). According to Keohane, international 
IJIS Volume 2
B. COSKUN – HYDROPOLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
regime formation relies on rational-choice analysis, and self-interested actors 
within the international system try to establish international regimes through 
mutual agreement (Keohane 1991). Within this context, Stein is concerned with 
the demand for regimes and his argument is also based on rational choices of self-
interested actors. He argues that: 
  
…the same forces of autonomously calculated self-interest that lie at the 
root of the anarchic international system also lay the foundation for 
international regimes…there are times when rational self-interested 
calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making in 
favour of joint decision making (Stein 1991:132).  
Moreover, he states that by providing a legal framework, regimes may make 
agreements easy to enforce.  
 
When it comes to regime formation, Young defines three different paths to regime 
forms: (1) spontaneous, in which regimes emerge from converging expectations; 
(2) negotiated, in which regimes are formed by agreements; and (3) imposed, in 
which regimes are forced by external powers. Among these formation shifts, 
imposed regimes are the most sensitive ones to power shifts in the division of 
power in the international system since it is closely tied with the power structures 
(Young 1991). Moreover, in all types of regime formation hegemonic powers use 
their powers to sustain a regime which promotes their interests, or they can veto 
the formation of a regime which challenges their interests. In other words, in 
regime formation power, defined by Keohane and Nye (1989:1) as “the ability of 
an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do”, plays a vital 
role. Besides the influence of hegemons, the power relations among actors within 
a sub-system should be taken into consideration. Both in formation and in 
continuation of a regime, interdependency among actors and the vulnerability of 
actors towards others’ actions within the system also play major roles. According 
to Keohane and Nye, the power structure affects the nature of a regime and the 
regime in turn governs the political bargaining and decision making within the 
system (Keohane and Nye 1989). 
 
With regards to international waters, the concept of “water regimes” has been 
attracting more and more attention. Water regimes refer to the constrained 
mechanisms that guide the actions of parties in a river basin (Jagerskog 2001:1). 
Regime theory can be applied to the analysis of cooperation over river basins, and 
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offers a relevant tool for the analysis of how compromised solutions could be 
found (Jagerskog 2003:49). 
 
According to Hafterdorn (2000:65), water regimes come into existence “when 
affected states to a conflict observe a set of rules designed to reduce conflict 
caused by use, pollution or division of a water resource or the reduction of the 
standing costs and the observance over time of these rules”. He distinguishes 
between regimes that are established to deal with all future water conflicts like the 
1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water Courses and 
International Lakes and the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, and water regimes that are 
connected to a particular conflict.  
 
As far as general water regimes that are established to deal with all future water 
conflicts are concerned, it is mainly the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses that can be applied for 
transboundary river management issues in addition to regional agreements aiming 
at the resolution of particular conflicts. In the 1997 Convention, development of 
rules of international law regarding non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses is aimed to promote and implement the main principles for non-
navigational uses of transboundary watercourses. Furthermore, the general 
principles with regard to “equitable and reasonable utilization and participation” 
and “obligation not to cause significant harm” are determined by the convention 
(articles 6 and 7).   
 
In fact, the existing international water law documents are ambiguous and vague 
in the case of transboundary waters because of the uniqueness of each water 
dispute. As a result of the ambiguity of the "equitable" and "reasonable" 
distribution of water definitions in international documents, generally the riparian 
states have different perceptions and interpretations. Regardless of how 
specifically the body of law might identify what really constitutes "equitable and 
reasonable" distribution, the parties are inclined to interpret the law according to 
their own interests. Therefore, the riparians’ arguments on what constitutes 
equitable and reasonable distribution of water reflect their interests and needs. 
Within this context, riparian states have sought for regional basin-wide regimes in 
order to resolve transboundary water management problems instead of just relying 
on existing international water regimes.  
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Given its economic value, in Central Asia, where water scarcity and competition 
are acute, water has become a part of high politics and the possibility of water 
related conflicts has been increasing. The problems of increasing demand and 
declining supplies have led to unfettered competition for water. Tensions focus on 
the two main rivers of the region that both flow to the Aral Sea: the Syr Darya 
from Kyrgyzstan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and the Amu Darya from 
Tajikistan through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Amu Darya and its 
tributaries form part of the border between the Central Asian states and 
Afghanistan (see figure 1: Map of Aral Sea Basin). So far the tensions have been 
contained without any conflict, but because the regional states continue to 
consider the problem to be a “zero-sum game”, the possibility of a cooperative 
resolution is getting harder to reach.   
 
Around 90% of the region’s crops need irrigation. Cotton is the most valuable 
product for the regional economies, particularly for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
Cotton production employs 44% of Turkmenistan’s work force and makes up 
76% of Uzbekistan’s revenues (Horsman 2001). As far as upstream countries are 
concerned, over 50% of Kyrgyztan’s and Tajikistan’s electricity production relies 
on hydroelectric power. Within this context: 
 
…an annual cycle of disputes has developed between the three 
downstream countries - Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - that 
are all heavy consumers of water for growing cotton, and the upstream 
nations - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The downstream countries require 
more water for their growing agricultural sectors and rising 
populations, while the economically weaker upstream countries are 
trying to win more control over their resources and want to use more 
water for electricity generation and farming (ICG Asia Report 2002:i). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, water management has become a complex 
transboundary water management problem. During the Soviet Union era, the 
Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources in Moscow was the single 
official agency responsible for water allocation. It was also assigned as the final 
arbiter for solving disagreements. With the independence of the Central Asian 
states, this centralized structure fragmented into the hands of five governments 
who have different policy priorities and are very reluctant to work together. 
Furthermore competition among regional states has caused failures in providing a 
feasible regional approach to replace the Soviet water management system, in 
which quotas, fixed by Moscow, favoured the downstream cotton-producers at the 
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expense of mountainous and less developed Kyrgyztan and Tajikistan (ICG Asia 
Report 2002). 
 
In other regions, where water is shared by different states, water management 
strategies between riparians have evolved gradually. But in the Central Asia case, 
states were forced to develop a ground for water management as a result of an 
urgent need for a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures regulating water allocation relations among regional states. 
With the interventions of international donor organizations and environmental 
NGOs, five newly independent states signed the Almaty Agreement in 1992, as an 
expression of their willingness to work towards joint coordination and action over 
water resources. Following the Almaty Agreement, a number of institutions 
concerning water management were established: the Interstate Coordinating 
Water Commission (ICWC), the sub-ordinate Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basin 
Management Authorities (BVOs), the Interstate Council on Problems of the Aral 
Sea Basin (ICAS), and the International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS). In spite of 
the existence of external intervention in the regime formation over shared river 
basins, the “water regime” that is formed by Central Asian states cannot be called 
an imposed regime. Rather, it has emerged from converging expectations and 
formed spontaneously, aiming at water allocation among the republics, regulation, 
use and protection of watercourses, and avoidance of disputes before they arise. 
 
While some optimistic donor organizations and international institutions consider 
these institutionalisation efforts to establish a water regime as an example of a 
success story, there are still serious areas of tensions over water management 
among the Central Asian states. According to the ICG’s report entitled Central 
Asia: Water and Conflict, these institutionalised efforts for transboundary water 
management in the region have just imposed a very similar version of Soviet 
central planning and not provided an effective ground for long-term water 
allocation disputes since the new states will not be satisfied with the economic 
roles previously assigned by Moscow. Furthermore, the inter-state institutions’, 
namely the ICWC and the IFAS, lack of transparency and narrow focus 
emphasizing mainly water division, have led to a failure in dealing with rising 
tensions over water resources (ICG Asia Report 2002). In spite of the agreements 
signed, institutional arrangements cannot be regarded as successful because of the 
weak political commitment and cooperation, and financial and legal constraints 
(Bedford and Micklin in Horsman 2001). In this regard, the question that arises is: 
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can transboundary water management in Central Asia be considered as a 
regional water regime?  
 
According to Krasner, in the international system the main function of regimes is 
to help achieve desired outcomes which cannot be achieved through 
uncoordinated individual self-interests (Krasner 1991). In order to form 
international regimes, rational self-interested calculations must lead actors to 
abandon independent decision-making in favour of joint decision-making. 
However, in the Central Asia case, individual states still put their own self-interest 
and decision-making before joint interests and decision-making. The disunified 
character of the internal dynamics of the region does not encourage efforts to form 
a regional water regime. Furthermore, amongst the Central Asian states there is no 
particular state that has the power to enforce a regime formation. As previously 
mentioned, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are equally powerful and 
they are far from forming alignments with each other especially in light of the 
political rivalry between the leaders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Thus, as far 
as regional decisions are concerned this rivalry restricts the potential for 
compromise. 
 
The potentially unstable water security issue of the region has attracted extra-
regional interests. Three neighbouring states, Afghanistan, China and Iran, outside 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, plus the US have direct impacts on 
regional water security because of their hydrologic boundaries with the regional 
states. Among the three, Iran has a trivial effect because only 2% of its territory 
and less than 1% of its population are within the basin (Horsman 2001). On the 
other hand, Afghanistan with 40% of its territory and 33% of its population within 
the Aral Sea Basin has a more complex impact. The absence of Afghanistan from 
regional water institutions weakens the possibility of a long-term regional water 
regime. For China, water demands and policies are interlinked with its economic 
and political objectives in Xinjiang region. China has planned to extract water 
from two of the tributaries in order to stimulate the economy of Xinjiang, to raise 
living standards and to reduce support for Uigur irredentism. If this plan succeeds, 
it will reduce one of the sources of transboundary security issues for the region 
(Horsman 2001). As far as the US is concerned, it has used environmental 
assistance for security objectives. According to Weinthal, the Aral Sea crisis has 
offered a safe issue area for US foreign policy in Central Asia (Weinthal 2000). 
Through the Agency for International Development (USAID), confidence 
building and cooperation among regional states have been attempted and some 
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environmental projects have been implemented. But the main objective for the US 
is to create a stable regional environment for its economic interests in the oil and 
gas sector and create a counter balance for Iranian influence in the region.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Disputes over water resources are one of the major threats for the Central Asian 
republics’ security. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, water management 
has turned into a very complicated transboundary water management problem 
among five Central Asian states. Both internal and external dynamics of the 
Central Asian regional security complex have played roles in the resolution or 
non-resolution of the water management disputes.  
 
In spite of the existence of some half-hearted attempts, a regional water security 
regime has not been achieved yet. As a result of the competition among regional 
states in terms of enforcing their own national interests at the expense of other 
states’ vulnerabilities, regional cooperation over water allocation is still 
problematic and fragile.  
 
Internal dynamics of the region, competing interests, and the absence of powerful 
actors among the regional states has negatively effected the formation of a water 
regime. On the other hand, international involvement has acted neither as a 
medium nor as a solution for regional water disputes. External actors are unable to 
influence the internal dynamics of the region since their involvement has  been 
aimed at securing their own interests regardless of regional dynamics.  
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    Abstract 
This article examines the political dilemma faced by the Economic and Monetary 
Union decision-makers with regards to fiscal policy co-ordination. It argues that 
two alternatives are available: national fiscal policies, constrained by budgetary 
rules at a central level, or a federal fiscal system. The operation of both of these 
options is discussed in accordance with the Optimal Currency Area theory and 
with reference to the monetary union in Europe. The former proves to be feasible, 
but not desirable; whereas the latter is desirable, but not feasible.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A monetary union without an accompanying economic and fiscal policy 
union would prove a house of cards that would collapse with every gust 
of wind.  
                                                           (Schiller in Dyson and Featherstone 1999:292) 
 
Having decided to move to the third stage of the monetary integration process in 
Europe in January 1999, the European Union’s member states took a gamble39 
hoping for a buoyant future. The euro was meant to reinforce the process of an 
“ever closer union” and guarantee robust economic growth in the years to come. 
However, so far the gamble has not paid off as the performance of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) over the last five years has been a bitter 
disappointment. Some of the blame can be put on the European Central Bank 
(ECB), which pursued an extensively restrictive monetary policy that kept the 
interest rates uncomfortably high,40 and the membership countries themselves, 
especially the core countries like Germany and France, who failed to introduce the 
                                                 
∗ Current master’s student  in the European Studies Program, Aalborg University. The author would 
like to thank anonymous referees for their helpful comments.  
39 See M. Obstfeld “Europe’s Gamble” (1996). 
40 Although it has to be stressed that the interest rates have been brought down to historically low 
levels. 
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needed structural reforms. However, none of the above are mentioned as often as 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as the main reason for EMU sluggishness. 
Although it is widely accepted that fiscal stimulus is not the best long-term route 
to growth, it is the Pact’s inflexibility that is held responsible. 
 
Moreover, the establishment of the EMU brought about a very bizarre policy mix 
in Europe consisting of a centralised monetary policy accompanied by national 
fiscal policies. The implementation of the SGP, aiming at securing a viable policy 
mix, proved to be inefficient. Therefore further development of a European State, 
based on the embryo of the monetary union, requires in the first place an 
amendment to the fiscal policy co-ordination rules. Such an action, though, must 
be backed by a clear recognition of the political project implicit in EMU and 
development of a fully fledged political arena (Boyer 2000:25, 88). 
Taking into consideration the above facts, this article looks at the fiscal aspect of 
the monetary union in Europe. It envisages a political dilemma facing the EMU 
decision-makers who are bound to choose between democratic politics and 
national self-determination as far as fiscal policy of  “Euroland” is concerned. By 
taking the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory as a point of departure, it 
concentrates both on the current co-existence of national budgets and the case of 
fiscal federalism and discusses the viability of both of these solutions.  
 
THE POLITICAL DILEMMA OF THE EUROZONE 
In his article “Feasible Globalizations”, Rodrik (2002)41 conceptualises the 
political trilemma of the global economy (figure 1) by arguing that “the nation-
state system, democratic politics, and full economic integration are mutually 
incompatible. We can have at most two out of three” (Rodrik 2002:1). As a way-
out, he calls for the creation of a renewed “Bretton Woods compromise”, 
preserving some limits on integration while establishing some global rules to 
handle the growing interconnectedness. 
 
41 See also Rodrik (2000). 
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FIGURE 1. THE POLITICAL TRILEMMA OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 
 
  
 
Source: Rodrik (2002)   
        
The present author tries to bring this deliberation onto European grounds with 
special reference to the fiscal dimension of the EMU. Nevertheless, as the process 
of economic integration has almost been completed in Europe with the 
implementation of the single currency, backing out of it is not in question.42 
Therefore there are only two options available (figure 2). We can either have a 
monetary union with national fiscal policies, strictly limited by fiscal constraints,43 
for example in the form of the existing SGP, or a monetary union with a 
democratic federal fiscal system. However, in order to analyse their sustainability, 
we first have to examine their roles in accordance with the OCA theory 
underpinning the concept of a monetary union.             
 
                                                 
42However, as noted by Eichengreen and Frieden (2001:15): “Technically, exiting the monetary union 
is straight forward: the government of the participating member state needs only to restart the printing 
press and reissue the national currency. If a country left the monetary union because it felt that the 
ECB was following excessively inflationary policies, its ‘good’ domestic currency would drive out the 
‘bad’ European currency. If the country instead left because it felt that the ECB’s overly restrictive 
policies were aggravating unemployment, it would in addition have to declare that the euro would no 
longer be accepted as legal tender within its borders.” 
43 Friedman (in Rodrik 2002:15) calls such constraints the “Golden Straitjacket” that a country puts on: 
“Golden Straitjacket narrows the political and economic policy choices of those in power to relatively 
tight parameters. […] Once your country puts on the Golden Straitjacket, its political choices get 
reduced to Pepsi or Coke – to slight nuances of tastes, slight nuances of policy, slight alterations in 
design to account for local traditions, some loosening here or there, but never any major deviation 
from the core golden rules.” 
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Source: Own model based on Rodrik (2002) 
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MONETARY UNION AND NATIONAL BUDGETS 
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44 For the original texts see Mundell (1961),  McKinnon (1963), and Ken
analysis of the OCA theory see for example De Grauwe (1997). 
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supply of savings in Country B45 and the equilibrium will be restored (De Grauwe 
1997:192). 
 
FIGURE 3: AGGREGATE DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
 
 
 
Source: P. De Grauwe (1997:6) 
 
Based on this simplified model, an argument can be made in favour of fully 
flexible and autonomous fiscal policies conducted by national governments 
participating in a monetary union. Moreover, such a way of managing fiscal 
policy is in line with the principle of subsidiarity as defined by Pius XI (in Inman 
and Rubinfeld 1998:1): 
Just as it is wrong to take away from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own ability and effort and entrust it to a community, 
so it is an injury and at the same time both a serious evil and a 
disturbance of right order to assign a larger and higher society what can 
be performed successfully by smaller and lower communities. 
As argued by Boyer (2000:88), the implementation of subsidiarity might appear to 
be a solution to the long-term viability of the single currency.  
However, fiscal expansion may appear to be a source of shock itself.46 First of all, 
increasing debt today implies higher taxes tomorrow. If factors of production are 
                                                 
45 However, one has to remember that the level of these budgetary effects depends to a large extent on 
the degree of wage flexibility and labour mobility (De Grauwe 1997:192). 
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mobile, as in the case of a monetary union, the prospect of raising taxes can lead 
to a situation of capital flight and labour migration, thus leading to the erosion of 
the tax base. It would also decrease substantially the competitiveness of a 
particular country. Therefore, the more integrated the factor markets are, the more 
difficult it is for a government to increase spending (Eichengreen 1993:1335). 
Secondly, expansionary fiscal policies of some countries can cause a rise in the 
interest rates in all the member states, hence, crowd out investment. Furthermore, 
financial capital inflow will lead to the single currency appreciation and reduction 
in the competitiveness of export production (Kenen 1995:91). Lastly, there is a 
problem of budget deficit sustainability.47 It is defined as follows (De Grauwe 
1997:194): 
A budget deficit leads to an increase in government debt which will have 
to be serviced in the future. If the interest rate on the government debt 
exceeds the growth rate of the economy, a debt dynamic is set in motion 
which leads to an ever-increasing government debt relative to GDP. 
This becomes unsustainable, requiring corrective action. 
For that reason, the use of fiscal policy has limits in offsetting negative economic 
shocks. In addition, due to the spill over effects, national fiscal policies can 
generate economic instability in all the members of the monetary union. 
These arguments, however, were played down constantly by proponents of fiscal 
autonomy. De Grauwe (1996) argued that once an independent central bank is set 
up and the governments lose control over their central banks, the capital markets 
will be able to force them to fiscal retrenchment. The assumption here is that, if 
the capital markets work efficiently, the problem of growing indebtness in one 
country will not be transferred outside its borders as the markets will attach a risk 
premium only to that particular country’s bonds. Therefore, interest rates in other 
monetary union members will remain unchanged (De Grauwe 1997:198).  
Dornbusch (1997) points also to the provision of “no-bailout”. In accordance with 
article 103 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC):48
 
46 As argued by Obstfeld (1996:280), the fiscal expansion of the Johnson administration during the 
1960’s helped to bring down the Bretton Woods, whereas the German reunification can be held 
responsible for the 1992/1993 European Monetary System crisis. 
47 For further analysis of this problem see De Grauwe (1997). 
48 The no-bailout clause was also implemented in the “Protocol on the Statue of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank” (art. 21). 
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The Community shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of 
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other 
bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member 
State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint 
execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or 
assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or 
other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial 
guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. 
In view of the above, borrowing commitments of Member States are their internal 
problem, hence, any externalities of fiscal expansions are unlikely. Additionally, 
regardless of the above critique, von Hagen and  Eichengreen (1996) argue that, in 
the event of financial difficulties, countries retain the possibility of raising their 
own taxes, which reinforces the credibility of the no-bailout rule.49
Nevertheless, none of the above advocates seem to fully recognise the prospect of 
free-riding once the monetary union is in place. As the Maastricht Treaty does not 
allow for any country to be expelled from the EMU, a monetary union becomes a 
public good, and as with every public good, it is exposed to the aforementioned 
problems.  By over borrowing, countries risk defaulting on their debt by means of 
stopping interest payments on the outstanding debt50 (De Grauwe 1997:203). As 
an ex-post bailout is prohibited under the current readings of both the TEC and the 
ESCB Statute, the remaining option for the ECB is to bailout countries facing debt 
crisis by keeping interest rates low to lighten the debt-service burden (ex-ante 
bailout) (von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996). Such actions, though, might 
endanger the prime objective of the ECB, i.e. price stability. Therefore, fiscal 
rules can help to make ECB less likely to face such a dilemma (Masson 1996).51
 
 
49 In the debate between the proponents and opponents of biding fiscal rules in the EMU, the United 
States monetary union experience was also claimed as supporting both positions. The former group 
pointed to the existence of a state’s own voluntary constitutional limitations on borrowing and their 
usefulness, whereas the latter emphasised the joint absence of post-war defaults by state governments 
and of federally-imposed fiscal rules (Goldstein and Woglom 1992:253).   
50 This option is labelled in the literature as an “outright default”. The other option available, an 
“implicit default”, is achieved by creating surprise inflation and devaluation in order to reduce the real 
value of the debt (see De Grauwe 1997).  
51 Another way of eliminating free-riding, stemming from the traditional “realist” approach, would be 
emergence of a dominant state, a local hegemon, willing to use its power to keep the monetary union 
functioning effectively on terms agreeable to all (Cohen 2001:192).  
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FISCAL CONSTRAINS ON NATIONAL BUDGETS IN THE EMU 
The above analysis suggests that fully flexible national fiscal policies of monetary 
union members may be unsustainable in the long-run. Hence, constraints on them 
seem to be interpreted as safeguards for the Union’s credibility. However, in the 
case of the EMU, the “Golden Straitjacket” was put on countries even prior to the 
euro introduction. Initially, it took form through the Maastricht convergence 
criteria52 which were meant to secure the establishment of a deeply rooted 
“stability culture” that would ensure a viable monetary union and enable the ECB 
to produce stable prices at low real costs (Winkler 1995). Nevertheless, once it 
appeared that the third stage of the EMU would be composed of a wide number of 
countries, the fear of free-riding intensified. It led to the implementation, mostly 
on the German insistence, of the SGP obliging Member States to “respect the 
medium-term budgetary objective of close to balance or in surplus” (European 
Council 1997). It also set out the borderline for the budget deficit at the level of 
3% of the GDP53 and gave the Council the right to use sanctions amounting to 
0.5% of the GDP against countries that are found in breach of the Pact. 
Both the Excessive Deficit Procedure, which is a part of the Maastricht Treaty, 
and the SGP itself, reflect the “structure [of the EMU] that is preoccupied by a 
‘sound money’ view, in which the central risk is perceived to be a ‘debt trap’” 
(Dyson 2000:9). They try to bridge the gap between economic rationale, calling 
for a closer co-operation of economic policies, and political feasibility. As noted 
by Tsoukalis (2003:157): 
We have created a European single currency with a weak and 
unbalanced institutional structure, and rigid rules to compensate for 
those faults. This is what was politically feasible at the time, and the 
architects of EMU went for it, postponing several difficult decisions – 
only half-consciously perhaps, since their design closely reflected 
current economic fashion. 
Such a feeble structure may, however, jeopardise the outcome of the monetary 
integration process.  
 
52 For the analysis of the Maastricht convergence criteria see for example Winkler (1999) and De 
Grauwe (1997). 
53 The German preoccupation with the reference value of 3% of the GDP seemed to be theoretical and 
artificial as no theory supported such a precise figure (see Dyson and Featherstone 1999:9). 
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The SGP has recently come under severe criticism. It has been renamed the 
“Stupidity Pact” after the President of the European Commission, R. Prodi, called 
it stupid (The Economist 2002a), and “The Instability and Depression Pact” (The 
Economist 2002b). Moreover, De Grauwe (2002) sees it as a vote of no 
confidence by the European authorities in regards to the strength of the member 
countries. According to him: 
It is quite surprising that EU-countries have allowed this to happen, and 
that they have agreed to be subjected to control by European institutions 
that even the International Monetary Fund does not impose on banana 
republics (De Grauwe 2002). 
Although a requirement of some fiscal constraint within the EMU is widely 
recognised, the Pact has failed to strike a right balance between the need for rules 
and flexibility. According to De Grauwe (1997:206-9), “the stability pact has been 
guided more by the fear of unsustainable debts and deficits than by the need for 
flexibility”. It is too inflexible, especially at a time of economic slowdown when it 
forces countries to tighten fiscal policies in the situation of falling tax revenues as 
their economies slide into recession. It has also failed to distinguish properly 
between cyclical and structural factors (The Economist 2003). Moreover, the 
reference value of GDP 3% appears to be arbitrary and “could hamper the 
operation of the automatic stabilisers and thus increase the volatility of output” 
(Beetsma 2001:24).54 Additionally, in November 2003 the SGP appeared to be 
unenforceable. After it has been breached for two consecutive years by France and 
Germany, the majority of the Member States voted against the recommendations 
of the Commission that wanted to initiate the Excessive Deficit Procedure against 
both of them. In fact, the decision of the ECOFIN Council meant the abolishment 
of the Pacts rules.   
At the very least, the SGP should be redefined in terms of the fiscal balance 
adjusted over the economic cycle which would give governments a bit more room 
to respond to a slump (The Economist 2002b). It also has to pay more attention to 
the aggregate fiscal stance. As argued by Buti et al. (2002: 11), “the aggregation 
of nationally-determined fiscal policies may not result in an optimal fiscal stance 
at the euro area level… and may not be suitable to ensure an adequate policy 
mix”. Such an inappropriate fiscal stance may occur even without violation of the 
Pact.55 Reform of it should also eliminate the disincentives to government 
 
54 See also Eichengreen and  Wyplosz (1998). 
55 For more on the reform of the SGP see De Grauwe (2003) and Buiter (2003). 
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investment in infrastructure and human capital, created by the current rules, which 
are said to be crucial for boosting long term economic growth (De Grauwe 2003). 
Remodelling the Pact, however, would not remove the “Golden Straitjacket” 
circumscribing autonomy of national fiscal policies. Therefore, it appears to be 
worthwhile to consider the option of fiscal federalism in Europe.56  
 
MONETARY UNION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM 
Let us recall the assumption made earlier in the text: a monetary union, formed by 
two countries, Country A and Country B, experiences an asymmetrical shock 
(figure 3) that neither labour mobility nor wage flexibility is able to accommodate 
fully, and fiscal policy is needed to restore equilibrium. However now we suppose 
that both countries, apart from centralising their monetary policy conduct, have 
also centralised a substantial part of their national budgets. Thus, the centralised 
budget will work as a shock absorber. The decline in tax revenues in Country A 
will be offset by the increase in transfers from the central budget, whereas the tax 
revenue increase in Country B will be accompanied by the decline in spending of 
the central budget. In this way equilibrium will be restored. The main difference 
between a centralised budget and national fiscal policies is that in the former case 
the country does not have to increase its external debt and face the prospect of 
servicing it in the future (De Grauwe 1997:191-192). 
The above analysis gives us a reason to claim that the creation of a monetary 
union should be accompanied by the implementation of fiscal federalism between 
the countries considered.57 The theory of fiscal federalism states that: 
…the central government should have the basic responsibility for the 
macroeconomic stabilisation function and for income redistribution in 
the form of assistance to the poor. […] In the absence of monetary and 
exchange rate prerogatives and with highly open economies that cannot 
contain much of the expansionary impact of fiscal stimuli, provincial, 
state, and local governments simply have very limited means for 
traditional macroeconomic control of their economies (Oates 
1999:1121). 
 
56 See for example  Korkman (2001), Grahl (2001) and the references therein. 
57 This argument was raised originally by Kenen (1969). 
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Three distinct functions are being assigned to fiscal federalism (Eichengreen 
1993:1337): first, the equalisation function that allows the low-income regions to 
continuously receive transfers from the rest of the federation;58 second, the 
stabilisation effect that causes the federal tax liabilities of all regions to go down 
and transfer receipts to go up once all regions enter recession simultaneously; and 
third, the regional co-insurance function that allows for the increase in the net 
transfers from the federal budget to a country that enters a recession not 
experienced by the rest of the federation members, i.e. a country hit by an 
asymmetrical shock. The last effect is meant to be a necessary component of a 
viable monetary union. 
 
FISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE EMU 
The problem of fiscal co-ordination in the future monetary union in Europe was 
brought to light during the work of the Werner Group in the 1970’s. The 
MacDougall Report (Commission 1977) suggested the creation of a centralised 
European budget capable of containing potential asymmetrical shocks. It 
recommended a three-stage approach (Hitiris 2003:101): 
• “pre-federal integration, with a Community public sector taking up 2-2.5% 
of Community GDP; 
• federation with a small Community public sector, 5-7% of GDP;59 and  
• union with a large Community public sector, 20-25% of GDP.” 
 
Lack of “political homogeneity” at that time to justify such a move was seen as an 
impediment on the road to a deeper fiscal integration (Hitiris 2003:101). The 
Delors Report (Commission 1989) reinforced that call by arguing in favour of the 
establishment of a powerful fiscal shock absorber at the central level, in order to 
deal with asymmetrical shocks (Kletzer and von Hagen 2001:2). However, none 
of these claims have been reflected in the Maastricht Treaty. 
The debate on fiscal mechanisms in the future monetary union in Europe rests to a 
large extent on the United States experience. The study of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs 
(1992), argues that the existence of a federal tax system was the reason behind the 
 
58 In the European Union the effect of equalisation is addressed by the notion of cohesion (Eichengreen 
1993:1337). 
59 It has to be remembered that “the Report was considering a monetary union among a smaller and 
less heterogeneous group of countries than the current members of EMU” (Kletzer and von Hagen 
2001:17). 
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viability of the dollar exchange rate, and found that approximately 40% of the 
one-dollar shock in a particular State is absorbed by the Federal Government.60 
Also Bayoumi and Masson (1995) support this view by taking into consideration 
the case of both the American and Canadian fiscal systems.61 A more recent study 
by Kletzer and von Hagen (2001) calls not only for the introduction of fiscal 
federalism, but an advanced co-ordination of economic policies. It argues that: 
…the adoption of a common currency among a set of highly integrated 
regions implies that governments of these regions should no longer 
regard policies aiming at structural reforms of their local goods and 
labour markets as matters of purely regional concern (Kletzer and von 
Hagen 2001: 37). 
Nevertheless, the implementation of fiscal federalism faces at least two major 
problems as far as the current European Union budget is concerned. First and 
foremost, it is too small. The budgetary ceiling rests at the level of 1.27% of the 
GNP and, together with the prohibition of borrowing, it makes the EU budget 
hardly comparable to the central budget common to federations and the provisions 
made by the MacDougall Report (Tondl 2000:235-6). Second, the structure of 
both the revenues and expenditures is far from meeting the functions of fiscal 
federalism. The revenue side consists of four sources.  However, the GNP-based 
national contributions and the community’s share in the VAT account for almost 
82% of the total revenues.62 The two remaining resources include custom duties 
and agriculture levies (Hitiris 2003:95-96). The revenues are primarily regressive 
as the poorer countries generally spend a higher share of their income on 
consumption and are more import-dependent compared to richer members. A 
limited progressiveness is reflected only in the case of the GNP-based 
contributions (Tondl 2000:239). Almost 80% of the budget expenditures are 
devoted to the Common Agriculture Policy and Structural Funds. The cohesion 
impact of the former is rather mixed. Although within countries it has a positive 
redistributive impact, on average it transfers income from richer regions to the 
poorer ones, where higher food prices have a regressive impact on consumers, as 
lower income households spend a higher share of their budget on food (Tsoukalis 
1997:214). The operation of the latter has a clear redistributive effect. The total 
transfers in the period of 1994-99 represented 0.45% of the EU GDP and are 
 
60 Their results were criticised by von Hagen (1992) for failing to distinguish between the equalisation 
and insurance functions of transfers.  
61 According to their measures, the stabilisation effect is around 30%. 
62 Data concerning the EU’s general budget for 2002.  
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estimated to have an income equalisation effect of 5% (Commission data cited by 
Tsouklais 1997:204). However, it has to be noted that structural fund transfers are 
not used to correct income differentials, but to finance public investment in the 
weaker regions (Commission 1989:22). 
Therefore, the implementation of the principles of fiscal federalism requires a 
general modification of the EU budget. As proposed by G. Tondl (2000:252-3): 
The central points are the introduction of individual EU taxes, social 
transfers to individuals, and a sharp reduction of CAP guarantee 
payments in favour of other expenditure items. The management of 
interregional distribution, now operated by several funds, could be 
effected by a single, new cohesion fund. 
Having such a healthy-constructed budget would allow at least for the 
establishment of a system of fiscal equalisation based, for example, on the 
German Länderfinanzausgleich (Kletzer and von Hagen 2001:17). 
 
CONCLUSION      
The creation of the EMU in Europe was made possible by political consensus 
among state leaders. It was meant to become an embryo for a future European 
State. However, to date the centralisation has taken place only in the monetary 
component of economic policy. The implementation of the SGP as an element of 
fiscal co-ordination has proved inefficient. Therefore, the EMU decision-makers 
are facing a dilemma concerning the conduct of fiscal policies in the monetary 
union. As neither backing out of the single currency project nor keeping fully 
autonomous national fiscal policies is possible, they must choose between 
national fiscal policies, constrained by the ‘Golden Straitjacket’ in the form of 
some central rules, or the federal fiscal system. This article has analysed their 
operation in accordance with the Optimal Currency Area theory only, which limits 
the validity of the agreed upon conclusions, as the problems of the EMU go far 
beyond the fiscal aspects. Nevertheless, it can be argued that decentralised 
budgetary policies are feasible, but not desirable. The recent troubles of the Euro 
zone’s two biggest economies, namely France and Germany, reaffirm that 
statement. The latter may be desirable, but it is not feasible.63 Fiscal federalism 
has not yet won enough support in Europe to be treated as more than a theoretical 
 
63 See Rodrik (2002). 
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option. Still, its implementation appears to be desirable as it could help to correct 
the democratic deficit in the EMU. The “traditional mystique” surrounding 
monetary policy could be offset by more democratic accountability required in the 
case of the federal budget. Thus, a new institution accountable to the European 
Parliament is required in order to balance the domination of the ECB in the 
economic debate at the European level. The new born Eurogroup, consisting of 
finance ministers from the EMU participating countries, seems to be the natural 
selection (see e.g. Tsoukalis 2003). As Tocqueville predicted, writing in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, “in the democratic ages which are opening upon us 
[...] centralisation will be the natural government” (Tocqueville in Oates 
1999:1145).  
During the work of the European Convention, a great opportunity for changing 
the current readings of the treaty passed. The draft constitution, prepared by the 
group chaired by Giscard d’Estaing, has not changed anything as far as the 
excessive-deficit procedure is concerned. Another chance that is nearing on the 
horizon is the perspective of budget 2007-13 talks. However, a serious 
impediment on the road to a federal budget, and further to a European State, might 
be far beyond economic rationale and political commitments. A successful EMU, 
where both the “E” and the “M” are in place, might require a genuine sense of 
community among countries, defined by Keohane and Hoffmann (1991:13) as “a 
network form of organization, in which individual units are defined not by 
themselves but in relation to other units”. From that point of view, federalism has 
still a long way to go in Europe.             
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